

## **SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH**

**Clarence J. Bouchat**

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


## FOREWORD

For a topic long overlooked by American policymakers and strategists, the security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. This nascent importance is readily seen in the increased time, effort, and resources now devoted to the continent by such new organizations as the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa.

This paper seeks to overcome this lack of understanding of the significance of African security and stability by discussing the fundamental issues of economic development and political governance through which enduring stability and security might be obtained. This primer is particularly relevant for government and military officials tasked with African responsibilities but who may not possess much African experience.

This is not a typical Letort Paper advocating a position or a policy. Although it does offer solutions in terms of improving African stability and security, its main intent is to offer a framework of several key issues which should give policymakers the knowledge they need to work in a constantly changing and very challenging environment. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this paper as a contribution toward a more complete understanding of Africa and its security and economic environments in order to improve the conditions of its people.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CLARENCE J. BOUCHAT is a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel and is currently a senior researcher with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and an adjunct professor at the Harrisburg Area Community College, and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Department of Distance Education. His last assignment was as a faculty member of the USAWC. Immediately after retirement he went to Liberia as part of a Security Sector Reform team meant to reconstitute a new Ministry of Defense after 14 years of devastating and internecine civil war. During his military career, Lieutenant Colonel Bouchat flew fighter aircraft; was a leader and innovator in command and control of airpower before, during, and after Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; and he was stationed overseas six times. In this paper, he combines his extensive knowledge of economics and political geography, gained while teaching at the U.S. Air Force Academy and at the University of Maryland, with strategic analysis as taught at the USAWC to explain some of the problems found in Africa, and to propose solutions. Lieutenant Colonel Bouchat authored a complementary monograph, *An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security*, previously published by the Strategic Studies Institute. Lieutenant Colonel Bouchat is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and the University of Southern California.

## SUMMARY

Economic activities are the most central of all human endeavors. Although rich in human and geographic diversity, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world in its economic development, adversely impacting African aspirations. This paper explains why economic development and good governance need to be the basis of security and stability in Africa, and why both should be a main focus for U. S. military engagement on the continent.

Written as a primer for military and government staff members who may be unfamiliar with Africa but are assigned duties that involve participation in African affairs, this paper explains the historic and modern importance of Africa to American national interests. It then lays a foundation as to how and why the U.S. government, and especially the military, might become involved in improving African economic development and political governance in order to attain security and stability. To better understand the circumstances in Africa, this paper describes and analyzes its economic and political conditions in terms of economic, social, and demographic measures revealing why, as a region, Africa lags the world in economic and human development. The reasons for slow development are examined through Africa's main economic activities, which give insight to its current conditions and ways to improve economic development and governance.

With these insights provided as background, the paper then reviews current U.S. military engagement with African nations and its effectiveness. It then argues that military-led nation assistance and peace building operations are not as good an option for improved African development as the more appropriate approach



of military-support to an interagency-led operation under a better resourced U.S. Agency for International Development, which would more effectively assist Africa with achieving stability and security.

## **SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH**

### **WHY EXAMINE A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO AFRICA?**

For generations, Africa has been known as the Dark Continent because of the general Western ignorance of its geography, especially before the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and more recently of its people and culture. This ignorance has led to centuries of degradation through imperialism and decades of misinformed policies. However, over the past several years there has been a renewed interest by the U.S. Government in Africans and their continent, as evidenced by increased interaction in diplomacy, defense, and development. Many recent programs meant to better engage African states and their people attest to this interest through billions of dollars spent on disease reduction, promoting peace through enhancing African peacekeeping abilities, and free trade opportunities to encourage growth. Although Africa has grown more important to Americans and their interests in the past decade, in many ways the U.S. Government and military officials are no better informed on Africa than were their predecessors. In light of this newfound interest in Africa, and new organizations like the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), this paper strives to educate those who are unfamiliar with Africa, but tasked with participating in its affairs. This paper starts with a brief overview of why Africa has grown more important than ever before to Westerners—especially Americans, both North and South—to explain this increased interest, and to motivate those wishing to understand more. This paper then lays the

foundation for establishing much needed stability and security in what has been an unsettled and violent region by linking those desired conditions to economic development and good governance. The defense and diplomacy aspects of security and stability are relatively well understood by most military and government officials, but the economic development aspects are not. For that reason, this survey explains the poor economic and governance situation found in Africa and examines the economic activity underpinnings of it so as to enlighten new practitioners about what has occurred and what changes are taking place. This review then examines the military's role in improving conditions in Africa by discussing the current forms of engagement and proposes more robust methods of military involvement. When use of the military is required, the U.S. military can best serve stability interests in Africa by conducting traditional security enforcement, newly relearned stability operations, and expanded peace building roles under the firm direction of a professional development agency. As interest in Africa increases, USAFRICOM will play a growing role, but one that must be properly defined to gain the best effect.

### **Africa's Importance and Problems.**

The West's long-term strategic interests in Africa are clear: we must thwart the growth of terrorism and transnational crime; we must prevent destabilizing mass migrations; and we must maintain secure trade links. In order to realize these strategic objectives, as well as to act out of simple human compassion to alleviate suffering on a colossal scale, the world must fix the current situation in Africa. From a more selfish perspective, a

strong and vigorous Africa will open its markets to the rest of the world and at the same time liberate an entire continent's energy, intelligence, and creativity.

– USAFRICOM Early Mission Statement<sup>1</sup>

The continent of Africa and its people have been a central part of world events since antiquity when northern Africa played a key role in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern affairs. A long and close association has grown between Arab states and northern and eastern Africa from ensuing centuries of commerce, slave trading, migration, and Muslim proselytizing. Europeans also share a long history with Africa, starting in the modern era with the expeditions sent by Portugal's Prince Henry the Navigator in the 1460s. From that time, Europe's imperial ties have established special relationships between those historic colonizers and their former dependencies, which are apparent today in many African languages, Christian beliefs, and economic and political institutions. Conversely, Africans have exerted economic and cultural influence in Europe as a result of the significant numbers of African immigrants living and working throughout the European Union (EU). Even for the relatively young Americas, Africa has played an important role since the notorious 17th century triangular trade,<sup>2</sup> which established Africa as a major base of international commerce and intercourse. The human connection between the Americas and Africa, originating in the forced migration of Africans as slaves, is of fundamental interest to both North and South Americans since large segments of their populations and culture descended from Africans. Over 45 percent of Brazilians are at least partially of African descent, and the share of pure African descendents in countries like Haiti, Grenada, and Jamaica exceeds 75 percent.<sup>3</sup> African cultural

has had dramatic influence on the Americas, which is evident in language, religion, food, and music (the reputed origins of jazz, blues, and rock-and-roll). The United States, with 12 percent of its population of African origin, has also maintained a semi-colonial connection with Africa through the reverse migration of freed American slaves to establish the country of Liberia in 1847, and the oscillating special relationship that resulted. Thus there are long and deep cultural ties between Africans and Europeans, Arabs, and Americans—establishing the first of many African influences throughout the world.

In the 21st century, Africa plays the same worldwide economic role that it has for the previous 4 centuries—providing natural resources from its plentiful supplies, and markets for manufactured goods. In earlier times foreign merchants traded for gold, salt, ivory, and grain (in addition to human chattel). Today, Africa is a crucial source of energy, strategic and ordinary minerals, and precious gems. West Africa holds 60 billion barrels of oil reserves and large natural gas deposits,<sup>4</sup> which are expected to comprise a quarter of U.S. petroleum imports by the year 2015.<sup>5</sup> Some analysts complain that this energy dependency is so important that it dominates U.S. policy in Africa at the expense of such other important concerns as security and development.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, North Africa supplies a third of Europe's oil and natural gas, much via undersea pipelines.<sup>7</sup> India, with its rapidly growing economy, also desires to tap into Africa's oil and significant uranium reserves through growing trade and diplomatic ties.<sup>8</sup> China depends on African oil for over 30 percent of its imports<sup>9</sup> and actively pursues fuel and mineral resources throughout the continent with large infrastructure investments,

supplying arms, and aid packages.<sup>10</sup> African states hold significant reserves of strategic minerals, with South Africa a world leader in platinum (89 percent), chromium (61 percent), vanadium (24 percent), and gold (14 percent); Congo a leader in cobalt (49 percent) and industrial diamonds (26 percent); and Botswana in industrial diamonds (22 percent) and gemstones (23 percent).<sup>11</sup> Africa has also been a traditional overseas market destination for manufactured goods starting with the triangular trade by importing refined metals, cloth, guns, and ammunition. Such trade is indicative of Africa's chronic economic underdevelopment that continues unabated. Today Africans buy some high end goods from Europe and America, but most of its needs are met by less expensive items from newly industrializing countries. Trade between China and Africa nearly tripled from \$10.5 to \$29.4 billion between 2000 and 2004,<sup>12</sup> and trade with India is estimated at \$25 billion.<sup>13</sup> The bonanza of natural wealth and potentially large markets for manufactured goods helps to explain the renewed interest and competition in Africa by the industrialized states, and why Africa's relatively underdeveloped situation is of increasing importance in the global economy.

Africa's strategic location also contributes to its global importance. Since antiquity, northern Africa has been part of the crossroads where three continents meet with an incalculable legacy of intellectual and economic activity. Africa was the barrier around which Europeans probed for the riches of the East and its importance remains, as it is flanked by major maritime passages at Gibraltar, Suez, the Bab el-Mandab, Cape of Good Hope, and the Gulf of Guinea. Its close proximity also makes oil, natural gas, and other African resources more attractive to European and American importers than similar goods from the more distant Middle

East (as well as contributing to the diversification and security of sources). During World War II, Africa was used by the Allies as a staging ground for troops bound for Italy and southern France and for ferrying aircraft from Brazil through Liberia to the European theater. In the subsequent years following WWII, the political neutrality and newly independent status of many African countries made the continent a battle ground during the Cold War through proxy conflicts and political competition for support. African countries still remain politically important for the 54 votes they cast in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and other international organizations and are wooed for their influence as one-quarter of the world's sovereign states. The People's Republic of China (PRC) gained admission to the UN General Assembly in 1971 with a large bloc of votes from African states. India hopes to use similar leverage in its favor to become a permanent member on the UN Security Council.<sup>14</sup> Even the Nordic countries, with no vital interests in Africa, are very engaged in the region for the influence they can win "gaining international prestige and building reputations in order to achieve influence in a highly institutionalized world."<sup>15</sup> Whether as an obstacle, target, or transit area, Africa's combination of strategic central location and international role remains an enduring part of its global importance.

The African continent's location, spanning the equator, has also given it a rich ecological diversity and a key role in global climate and human health. Africa's stunning physical beauty and cultural richness, as well as close proximity to Europe and strong historic and cultural ties with Europeans, is the foundation of an international tourism industry that is an economic

mainstay to many African countries. Ecologically, Africa's bio-diversity is an important source for economically valuable medicinal, food, fiber, and industrial products. For example, 25 percent of cancer medicines used in the United States originated from one of 40 rain forest plants from around the world, many of them from Africa, with 250 others known to have anti-cancer characteristics, and tens of thousands of other plants yet unexamined but threatened with extinction.<sup>16</sup> Protecting such assets should be an international concern. Africa's tropical forests also act as a *carbon sink* that moderates the global climate, but the forests are shrinking rapidly, for example Cameroon currently has only 40 percent of its original forest, the best condition of any African country. This loss contributes to the buildup of green house gases, soil degradation, and desertification.<sup>17</sup> Another related world-wide threat is emerging in Africa's interior. Over the past several decades, with the opening of previously inaccessible parts of Africa, the world has seen the sudden emergence of virulent diseases such as Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers. Slower developing Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/ AIDS) also originated in Africa<sup>18</sup> and serves as a warning that local diseases may have world-wide consequences. Left alone, Africans would suffer greatly from their diminishing ecological heritage and devastating diseases, but so would the rest of the world through pandemics, global climate change, and loss of economic potential. For these reasons, it is easy to understand why Africa is important at the international level for a host of environmental, health, and well-being related issues, and why strengthening international support for Africa is necessary by the world of nations.



For both charitable and self interests, the more developed peoples of the world have often demonstrated a humanitarian obligation to those in Africa. This tradition dates back to Christian and Muslim missionaries who wished to do good and advance Africans in what was summarized as the “white man’s burden” by Rudyard Kipling. Modern Western interest for the plight of Africans might be dated to the one million Ethiopians who starved to death in 1984, launching an unprecedented intervention campaign including the groundbreaking Band Aid recordings and Live Aid concerts.<sup>19</sup> Since then, Africa has been rocked by a series of natural and manmade disasters, including civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and desertification in the Sahel to name just a few that have garnered international attention and varying levels of assistance. Such tragedies have created enormous numbers of refugees, accounting for 7.5 of 9.2 million world-wide in 2005, and unsettled situations<sup>20</sup> that can lead to intra-African tensions and foment hotbeds of terrorism and other forms of violence. Africa’s rapidly growing population of nearly one billion people face other humanitarian problems like the contagious diseases African typanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), cholera, yellow fever, and river blindness that leave its population vulnerable. Malaria alone kills one million people annually in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>21</sup> These epidemics have been addressed through U.S. Government aid totalling \$15 billion as part of the United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, and renewed again in 2008. Most of this aid, along with many other programs from around the world, is destined for Africa to counter the two million infected with AIDS every

year amounting to an estimated 22 million already afflicted.<sup>22</sup> The cumulative suffering and lack of hope have led some 70,000 Africans annually, many the most highly educated, to migrate in search of a better life,<sup>23</sup> with 4.6 million settling in nearby Europe.<sup>24</sup> Much of this is through illegal immigration, including a dangerous trek by boat people, bringing many of the same problems and consequences experienced along the U.S. southern border.

Africa poses important security concerns for the world because of its frequent internal conflict, corruption, and weak political structures that have made African states insecure and unstable. Starting in 1957, the transition of colonial regimes to indigenous rule sometimes resulted in violence, but almost always in fragile and parochial governing schemes. Weak, inexperienced, and often self-serving governments, caught in the height of Cold War rivalries, made Africa an arena of international intrigue which rarely benefitted most Africans. The fighting in Angola and Mozambique are examples of prolonged suffering from such internal and external conflicts. To win favor and support for their causes, the Eastern and Western blocs offered aid that was usually unaccountable and misdirected, and thus reinforced a legacy of corruption and futility.<sup>25</sup> Africa's natural riches proved to be double-edged, as "likely to exacerbate a resource curse and benefits [that] accrue to elites thereby undermining development and democracy."<sup>26</sup> Sudan is an example where a government is not accountable to its people because its finances stem from oil sales, and its support comes from foreign governments.<sup>27</sup> Since their independence, Sub-Saharan countries have endured over 80 successful and 108 failed coups<sup>28</sup> attempts

accounting for 44 percent of the world's total.<sup>29</sup> The worst example of violence is the Democratic Republic of Congo's intra- and interstate fighting, which since 1996 has claimed 5.4 million lives, making it the bloodiest conflict since World War II.<sup>30</sup> Recent violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe shows that unrest can overturn decades of economic improvement. Another consequence is lack of confidence and investment of Africans in their homelands with over \$150 billion of their capital kept off-shore and not supporting the economy in Africa.<sup>31</sup> One U.S. Congressional Research Service Report on Africa concludes: "Instability . . . heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may threaten U.S. economic interests."<sup>32</sup> Its insecurity and instability keep Africa a focus of international geopolitics.

Another problem is that Africa's ill-governed spaces have also attracted terrorist groups by providing access to transport systems, safe havens, and venues for transnational terrorist funding.<sup>33</sup> Africa has been the location of several deadly terrorist acts committed against Western interests such as the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam in 1998, and against Israeli interests in Kenya in 2002. Wars, lawlessness, and corruption have also fostered international crime on an immense scale. Africa acts as a way station for illegal drugs from Latin America and Asia that are destined for Europe. Africa is the center of an upsurge in piracy in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, and Nigeria is a notorious source of Internet-based crime. Not surprisingly, India has concentrated its diplomatic initiatives in east African countries "to fight terrorism and ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean region, and to put a leash on the mafia groups that have been using some of these countries as a safe haven."<sup>34</sup>

To confront such conflict and crime, military forces from around the world have been involved in African affairs from the UN's first peace enforcement attempt in Congo in 1960, to numerous French and British interventions in their former dependencies. More recent military participation includes: the ill-fated U.S. mission in Somalia in 1994, and more successful efforts such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the international Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the Kimberly Process Scheme to prevent the sale of *blood diamonds*. The size and interlocking nature of problems explains why the U.S. National Security Strategy gives Africa renewed importance and seeks stability and security in Africa through improving governance and development by leading the actions of like-minded countries.<sup>35</sup>

In a world of increasing globalization, Africa is of rising importance to the international community for the opportunities it presents and the threats it poses. Africa's strong cultural ties, its rich traditions, and its essential economic trade have benefitted much of the world. Africa's location and its roles in climate moderation, world transportation, and international organizations are literally central to global interests. Africans' suffering from disease, underdevelopment, and poverty burdens and hobbles Africans and their participation in world activities. Finally, weak political will and institutions that tolerate rampant conflict, crime, and corruption threaten international security and stability, as well as African prosperity. These problems were increasingly addressed by the administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush through greater action and intervention in Africa.<sup>36</sup> President Barak Obama's first official visit to Africa in 2009 purposefully underscored Africa's

interconnectedness with the world by making his visit to Ghana part of his mission to a G-8 summit in Italy. He explained, “Africa is not separate from world affairs,” but is a fully integrated part of the global economy.<sup>37</sup> As Africa has grown more important to both the United States and the rest of the world, we need to better understand its debilitating problems and their causes, so that we might chart courses of action by which to address them.

### **The Keys to Stability and Security.**

Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the United States armed forces has shifted – away from solely focusing on direct American military action, and towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future.

– Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates<sup>38</sup>

Many causes have been suggested for the chronic problems Africans face: social, geographic, imperialist, ethnic, or religious, to name just a few. Because Africa’s problems are complex and diverse nearly any suggested cause may be contributory, but not necessarily fundamental. For example, in less-nuanced discussions, shorthand explanations sometimes attribute Africa’s problems to cultural stereotypes with easy labels that too often deal only with symptoms.<sup>39</sup> However, Africa’s cultural diversity may be a strength as well as a weakness. Physical geographic characteristics also offer both advantages and disadvantages as their benefit depends upon how nature’s cards are played.

Certainly some things, like Africa's propensity for disease, are detrimental – but Africa does not face any problems graver than those already addressed by other more successful developing regions of the world.<sup>40</sup> While on his first trip to Africa, President Obama directly addressed the reasons for Africa lagging by declaring, "For many years we've made excuses about corruption or poor governance, [insisting] this was somehow the consequence of neocolonialism, or the West has been oppressive, or racism . . . I'm not a believer in excuses."<sup>41</sup> The problems that Africans face come down to two fundamental challenges well within Africans' ability to control: establishing good political governance and sustainable economic development – both of which are part of the foundation of the stability and security they need.<sup>42</sup> Internal and regional security and stability enable the formation of proper governance and development, but good governance and economic improvement also directly contribute to stability and security. However, political governance and economic development are the structures upon which other problems will be solved. For policymakers, especially military ones looking to assist Africa, the security aspects are relatively well understood, but the economic and political sides are less well known, and need to be emphasized because they are crucial. For that reason, this paper surveys economic and political aspects of Africa's condition and their ties to security and stability, so as to better understand and achieve U.S. national interests and Africa's common goals.

Security and stability are recognized as precursors to solving other problems in a country because they form a needed solid foundation.<sup>43</sup> The traditional military view of state security is control of borders and vital accesses and absence of unwanted foreign

coercion in sovereign affairs. However, security and stability also require internal rule of law, order, and justice to form a safe, secure, and stable environment in which to gain the local populace's support.<sup>44</sup> From the 19th century Philippines to modern Afghanistan U.S. military operations show that state security and internal stability factors must be addressed to establish the prerequisites for building viable nations.<sup>45</sup> Simply stated, instability, violence, and war are major constraints to economic development anywhere in the world, as is especially demonstrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>46</sup> In part, this is because secure and stable conditions lay the foundation to sustain the good governance and economic development that make a state viable.<sup>47</sup> The commander of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center (CAC) calls such actions in places like Sub-Saharan Africa "preemptive stability operations," attaining security and stability before, and not after, violence starts.<sup>48</sup> The foundational need for stability and security is equally recognized by Africans, as when leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) realized that a "combination of poverty and bad governance is no doubt a great part of the causes of the conflicts in West Africa. Accordingly, there can be no economic advancement without a peaceful, stable and secure environment."<sup>49</sup> Liberia's Minister of Information is more explicit in that he supports the U.S. Government policy "that development operations must in some way become synergized with defense operations; the former cannot occur without the latter."<sup>50</sup> These are basic principles on which both Africans and those who wish to assist them can agree.

Stability and security contribute to human and economic development by establishing the conditions

by which they can flourish, but security and stability also depend upon them in a symbiotic way. The entire premise behind the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) philosophy of economic growth in post-conflict countries is that “the fundamentals of economic growth increase the likelihood of successfully preventing a return to conflict.”<sup>51</sup> Internal conflict may arise when modernization brings rising expectations within a society that “are difficult to assimilate in the unstable political systems which characterize the developing world.”<sup>52</sup> For instance, lack of economic development undermines stability through abject poverty when a population expects that conditions should be better.<sup>53</sup> This encourages risk takers to use violence to change the situation or at least gain their share of any meager wealth.<sup>54</sup> Growing expectations compound insecurity and instability when population growth outstrips economic growth, as happens in Africa. *The Joint Operating Environment* gloomily forecasts that over the next 20 years, it will be Africans who mainly constitute the bottom billion of poverty world-wide, resulting in violence within and between states.<sup>55</sup> Likewise dashed expectations due to political mal-governance undermine stability and security. Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu believes that in apartheid South Africa, “Stability and peace came when the inalienable rights of all were recognized.”<sup>56</sup> Political access and change are necessary to allow the readjustment and balance often required to avert violence in fragile states.<sup>57</sup> Such codependence among the essential conditions of stability, security, development, and governance makes improving the situation in Africa challenging. However, during President Bush’s last trip through Africa in 2008, he



specifically visited five countries to showcase their progress<sup>58</sup> and prove that advances are possible. With proper international assistance in these areas, Africa's contributions to the world and to the continent's own well-being will improve.

For military forces to assist in improvement, an understanding of their role is in order. The U.S. military, especially the Army and Marine Corps, have the ability to not only establish security and stability on foreign soil, but to promote better governance and economic development while doing so. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. forces are attempting similar goals through stability operations, defined in *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, as:

...various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.<sup>59</sup>

Because of its key role in achieving peace and political objectives, the importance of stability operations has been elevated by the Department of Defense (DoD) to the same level and priority as combat operations.<sup>60</sup> Likewise, French doctrine in FT-011 recognizes the stabilization phase as "both decisive and fundamental to the operation," although addressing here only the post-conflict nature of stabilization.<sup>61</sup> Clearly military forces are at times expected to establish lasting stability and security beyond policing and peace operations. Other countries have also found an important role for military forces for assisting Africa beyond being an intervening armed force. For example, "all Nordic states have either formulated strategies on how to coordinate efforts in order to address development

and security simultaneously, or pointed to the need for such strategies. Most such strategies include use of military forces.... [As part of its work for UNMIL in Liberia, Sweden] aims to create synergy between development and military efforts . . . as a holistic effort to address development and security simultaneously."<sup>62</sup> Dr. Thomas Barnett, an expert on global conflict forecasting, believes that the U.S. military will intervene more in "gap and seam states " in places like Africa to ensure world-wide stability and security, which "requires the [U.S.] Army to engage not only military and insurgent forces, but to concentrate on economic, cultural, and sociopolitical structures and issues."<sup>63</sup> The U.S. military and others in the world are capable of assisting in establishing security and stability, along with economic and political advances to chaotic, devastated, or impoverished places in the world.

Stability operations usually fall to military forces in the aftermath of conflict because the humanitarian need is immediate, and their skills and resources are readily available. Although stability operations have often been an unwanted and unintended mission, U.S. forces nonetheless have achieved significant results during such operations as in Mexico in 1847, the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Germany, and Japan. Such actions are crucial after conflict, but do not have to wait until the aftermath of fighting to be employed, as Nordic thinking on the subject has indicated. Indeed, U.S. doctrine also espouses the benefits of pre-conflict military support towards stability and security. The *Joint Operating Environment* recognizes that, "Preventing a war will prove as important as winning a war," and that a full range of skills and missions are now needed by military forces to achieve the stability and security that

both war and peace operations demand.<sup>64</sup> U.S. Army doctrine, the leading edge of U.S. military thinking, specifically states that stability operations may occur before hostilities, and thus may prevent hostilities and the need for armed intervention by addressing the causes of potential conflict.<sup>65</sup> The need for early non-armed military intervention is not a new concept for the U.S. military. During discussions on low intensity warfare during the 1980s, the necessity for early involvement well before the bullets fly was an understood tenet, if not often acted upon.<sup>66</sup> Today, the U.S. military forces are conducting stability operations not just in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, but in East and Central Africa as well. As part of CJTF-HOA's counterterrorism mission, its Director of Plans and Policy noted, "Our mission is 95 percent at least civil affairs . . . the main approach now focuses on defense-related development of communities and societies."<sup>67</sup> When explaining on-going U.S. bilateral military training and operations in the Saharan region, a U.S. unified command staff officer observed, "This is phase-zero (pre-conflict) warfare . . . so it [Africa] doesn't turn into an Afghan-like scenario."<sup>68</sup> Stability operations are an important way for military forces to foster stability and security through economic and political development. These operations show the utility of military forces in such actions and therefore the need for military members to understand the underlying economic and political problems in which military organizations such as USAFRICOM may assist. This is the type of thinking that underscores new military capabilities that can shape the security environment as referred to by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the quote that introduced this section.<sup>69</sup>

Other methods for attaining security and stability are peace building, state building, and nation building. These are successively more involved and ambitious strategies that establish long-term stability in weak or failed states. The definition of peace building is similar in both U.S. and UN doctrine. The UN states “peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.”<sup>70</sup> The objectives of both UN peace building and U.S. stability operations are similar as well, as offered in *Field Manual* (FM) 3-07: safe and secure environment, established rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and a sustainable economy.<sup>71</sup> Despite the parallels between peace building and stability operations, differences exist. In U.S. doctrine, stability operations are a lead mission for the military, while other parts of government, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) take more responsibility in peace, state, and nation building. The focus and time horizon for both differ also, with stability operations specifically using near-term phrases like *essential*, *emergency*, and *relief*, while UN peace building touts broader goals and longer time frames as implied in the phrase “rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions.”<sup>72</sup> If stability operations are applied to their extreme, they can become state or nation building operations.<sup>73</sup> State building and nation building do not have official U.S. or UN definitions, so working concepts are used in this paper. In state building, other countries intervene to build or rebuild the structures of a weak or failed state in order to make these institutions more secure and stable for the long term.<sup>74</sup> Nation building broadens

the concept of state building through external actors who promote long-term economic well-being, social equity, and enhancing the citizenry's allegiance to the rebuilt state.<sup>75</sup> Military forces may help in constructing countries in need, as a lead or support organization, through the noncombat security and stabilization roles of stability operations and peace building. However, the more complex and involved roles of state and nation building are often avoided by armed forces, which prefer that civilian organizations dedicated to such long-term undertakings perform them.

A recognition by military commanders and staffs that Africa is important, imperiled, and may benefit from military involvement is part of the solution for problems in Africa. In this section, examples of military involvement were purposely left superficial simply to establish that military forces may have a significant role in Africa's security and stability. The analysis section of this paper deals with more specific ways of how military forces might be used to improve the situation in Africa. An understanding of African problems and their potential solutions is often lacking among military members, and training given to learn this knowledge is usually inadequate. One observer notes that in the military, "Too often the first question is about what should be done rather than the nature of the problem."<sup>76</sup> This violates the first step of conflict diagnosis, which aims to outline the key context issues of the operational environment, such as poverty.<sup>77</sup> This lack of crucial knowledge about development issues is not unique to U.S. forces and has also been noted by the UN as one defect hindering the use of military forces in socio-economic recovery and development.<sup>78</sup> To educate members to broaden their horizons to include a wider-than-military context as part of their solution,

the next sections explain Africa's poor economic and political situations in both absolute and relative terms. This paper should serve as a primer on issues and conditions for international participants in African stability. A better understanding of the economic and political situation and problems in Africa may build long-range mutual benefits for all concerned. The nature of the problems requires a holistic approach for Africa, one in which those who wish to improve its stability and security must understand its challenges.

## **DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY**

### **Africa's Human and Economic Development.**

In 1957, after 136 years under colonial occupation, Ghana's independence marked the beginning of the shift from colonial to majority rule in Africa. Ghana was chosen as one of the first states because it was best prepared for sovereignty, with a relatively efficient civil service and education structure, abundant natural resources, and a viable economy. That same year, by contrast, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was rebuilding a country devastated by 45 years of brutal Japanese imperialism and a subsequent 3-year conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of South Koreans. South Korea then labored under a dictatorial regime, was bereft of natural resources, and entirely dependent upon international aid.<sup>79</sup> In 1957, Malaysia also gained its independence after 446 years under Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonialism, and Japanese occupation. Independence was given while the then Malayan Federation was still in the midst of an ethnic and ideological insurgency, although, like Ghana,

Malaysia inherited a stable British civil structure and a larder of natural resources.<sup>80</sup> The per capita income of these new states was about the same that eventful year,<sup>81</sup> but Ghana with an economic growth rate of 5 percent seemed to promise the brightest prospects of the three.<sup>82</sup> Yet 50 years later, Ghana's Gross National Income (GNI) stood at just U.S. \$520 per person and ranked 177th globally by the World Bank. Malaysia's GNI was 10 times greater at U.S. \$5,490 and 80th in the world, and South Korea's GNI 34 times larger at U.S. \$17,690 and 49th.<sup>83</sup> Why did one of the better regarded African states with such early promise have such poor economic performance compared to states that were initially worse off? The explanation for these differences in economic standing between the countries of Africa and the rest of the world helps to explain some of the causes for the problems endured by Africans today.

Economic activities are the most central of all human endeavors. They are what satisfy the basic human physical needs of food, shelter, protection, and health. Economic activities also enable other higher order human endeavors, including cultural and political activities. Although rich in human and geographic diversity, Africa has lagged the rest of the world in its economic development, adversely impacting its human development and stability. To better understand economic problems in Africa, and to offer potential solutions, this section explains African development by comparing the few more-developed and many lesser-developed traits and characteristics of this continent in terms of economic, demographic, and social measurements. This review complements the next section which explores, on a macro scale, some of Africa's economic activities which describe the nature of local African economies and their impact on development and stability. Throughout these

discussions, the causes and potential obstacles that slow Africa's economic and political development are evaluated in order to recommend ways in which the United States and other interested parties can better organize themselves to support the African states and assist in their development. Economic and political development is the foundation upon which future African security, stability, population growth, environmental protection, and improvement in standards of living depend. Africa's natural and human resources are among the last great underused assets left on earth, and their proper development should be of concern to the world.

### **Measuring Africa's Economic Development.**

To understand the economic development of Africa, it is necessary to resort to statistics describing economic, demographic, and social conditions. Such statistics are often used freely in the media and academia to prove points and explain enigmas, but too often the numbers themselves are a mystery. How useful are such data and what do they relate to the reader? The opening example of this paper, comparing the economic standing of Ghana, Malaysia, and South Korea is a case in point. Is GNI a fair way to make such economic comparisons across continents and half a century? If so, what does it mean and can it explain the causes of poverty and underdevelopment? Economic size and growth is not the same as economic development, although each suffers in Africa. Development is used in a broad sense as the "progressive improvement of the human condition in both material and nonmaterial ways."<sup>84</sup> As this section demonstrates, economic growth may occur without improving human, political, or physical well-being. Economic development is closely



associated with human development and together they lay a foundation for an economy to sustainably boost itself through more sophisticated value-added activities by building social capital in education, equality, freedoms, culture, security, stability, and good governance; demographic well-being through improved health and population distribution; and economic capital in terms of better infrastructure, investment, diversification, and management. Economic development seeks to lessen environmental degradation, social and political inequality, and other stresses that sometimes accompany unregulated economic growth. These concepts put Africa's regional and representative states' economic, political, and social development into perspective. The measures examined here include GNI, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjustments, the Human Development Index (HDI) and its health and education components, political measures such as freedom and equality, and other economic and demographic indicators. This analysis should prove to be useful to planners and implementers of policy who are trying to better understand and improve the conditions encountered on the African continent.

By any measure of national income, the economies of Africa perform poorly when compared to the rest of the world. An economy is defined as "production, development, and management of [the] material wealth . . . system of a country or region."<sup>85</sup> Based upon this definition, it is easy to conclude that the best way to measure an economy is to aggregate its production, development, and management of wealth over a specific time period and for a defined area. If such a summation is calculated for the total value of goods and services produced over the period of a year

for a designated state or region, that measure is known as the Gross National Product (GNP) or GNI.<sup>86</sup> This measure quantifies all the value-added human activities in the private (reported currency exchange), public (government spending), and informal (barter and gray market) sectors of an economy in goods, services, and net return on investments originating from one state.<sup>87</sup> Typically such measures are based on a common currency like the U.S. dollar, requiring conversion rates and estimates, and thereby introducing some degree of error. Since large states with large populations are expected to produce more goods and services, GNP compares economic size and relative contribution of countries to the global economy. However, total GNI or GNP by itself is not a ready indicator of the wealth or development status of a country. To meaningfully compare the development status between states using GNP, GNP per capita must be used. The numbers used in the Ghana comparison at the beginning of this paper were adjusted in this manner to enable fair comparisons among the three states. GNP per capita compensates for increase in population along with growth in the economy at any given time so that chronological and lateral comparisons can be made. GNP does not incorporate non-marketed production as measures of economic pursuit such as parenting and maintaining one's own dwelling.<sup>88</sup> In terms of national income per capita, Sub-Saharan Africa has fared poorly, showing virtually no growth between 1960 and 2000, compared to the doubling registered by other low income areas of the world. Africa's economy has only grown as fast as its population. With only 10 percent of the world's population, Africa has 30 percent of the world's poor. The number of poor people doubled from 1980 to 2000 to 300 million, making Africa the only region in the

world where the number of poor is rising over the long term.<sup>89</sup> In summary, GNP is a relatively straightforward means to gauge the aggregate value-added economic activities of a country over time in order to measure economic progress and offer meaningful comparisons. This measure reveals Africa's relative and absolute poverty.

Use of GNP to measure development has flaws that are corrected through other related measurements. GNP, for instance, includes the net return on investments made overseas and infers increased wealth for the originating state, even if there was no real value added. This skews the perception of wealth to the investing rather than producing country. To make the distinction between value-added production *within* a country rather than *by* a country, GDP is more often used than GNP for comparisons.<sup>90</sup> Otherwise, GDP measures total market value, as does GNP, and both use per capita measurements as an indicator of economic development for a country. Among African states, use of GDP should bolster the measures of economic development since Africans are more likely recipients of overseas investment and aid than originators (*kleptocrats* excluded), so return on investments made from abroad are credited to the local African economies. Even with that edge, it is depressing to learn the per capita GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2000 grew at a very low annual rate of 0.1 percent, while the rest of the world averaged growth of 5 percent annually from 1980 to 2000.<sup>91</sup> Such a meager growth rate means that the African economies could barely outgrow the rate of their population expansion, and helps to explain why Africa remains the world's least developed region. Another method used to correct flaws in national income measurements is to weight GNP or GDP to reduce the fluctuations induced by

currency exchange or price distortions, a process known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP attempts to measure the domestic purchasing power capability in local currencies, giving a more genuine evaluation to the measure of economic development and a society's standard of living.<sup>92</sup> "It is based on the idea that identical baskets of traded goods should cost the same,"<sup>93</sup> and if they are not the same the difference should be used to adjust the national income measures. PPP measurements reduce the error that spikes in the transitory U.S. dollar exchange rate have in skewing the perception of economic development and standard of living, and account for the difficulty in obtaining common basic requirements for living in a society. Using the GDP, PPP usually reduces the perception of poverty suffered when compared to unadjusted figures. The differences in measuring economic development in terms of per capita value of GNI, GDP, and GDP-PPP are apparent in Table 1. The GNI and GDP at the official rate vary somewhat between them, as expected. However, the GDP at the official exchange rate diverges significantly from the GDP PPP, in this example by factors of 1.7 to 3.2. For the more developed United States and United Kingdom, the differences between the three measures are less. As is usually the case when using GDP-PPP, the citizens of some developing states actually have more purchasing power than the GNI or GDP values may indicate—often making the PPP measure an equalizing indicator. Not surprisingly, Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks below the rest of the world in average GDP-PPP at U.S. \$1,998, significantly below even the low-income-state world average of \$2,531. By any standard of economic measure, many states in Africa seriously lag the rest of the world's development standard and rates.

	Gross National Income	Gross Domestic Product Official Exchange	Gross Domestic Product Purchasing Power Parity
<b>Country</b>			
Algeria	3,030	3,800	8,100
Botswana	5,900	6,900	14,700
Chad	480	700	1,600
Congo, Rep	950 (2005)	1,800	3,700
Ethiopia	180	200	700
Ghana	520	600	1,400
Kenya	580	800	1,600
Mauritius	5,450	5,600	11,900
Nigeria	640	900	2,200
Sierra Leone	240	250	800
South Africa	5,390	6,200	10,600
UK	40,180	45,500	35,300
USA	44,970	45,800	46,000
Note: all figures in U.S. dollars and per capita data. GNI uses 2006 data; GDP uses 2007 data.			
Sources: GNI: World Bank, "Key Development Data and Statistics." GDP PPI and GDP Official Rate: CIA, <i>The 2008 World Fact Book</i> , 2008.			

**Table 1. Comparison of Development Measures of Economic Indicators.**

### **Measuring Africa's Human Development.**

Using economic measurements like GNI and GDP-PPP to gauge human development may still not adequately describe a development situation. Not all societies equally seek material wealth, and those that do not desire it may seem less developed than they actually are.<sup>94</sup> For that reason, social and demographic measures

are also used to give a more nuanced understanding of development, which should generate better solutions to weigh and counter poverty. If material goods are not universally held in the same high regard, there are other things that most modern societies do cherish and are willing to expend scarce resources to attain. Education and health care are two such attributes, and are crucial to the development of a vibrant economy. Both are human indicators of economic development, since the amount of resources allocated to these indicates the wealth of an economy, and dedicating these resources are an investment in future economic and human well-being. The health of a nation can be measured by markers such as expenditures on medical care as a percentage of national wealth, proportion of patients to doctors or nurses, or even by calories and protein received in an average daily diet. However, such social indicators of development are often indicated through related demographic statistics. For example, a long average life span is an aggregated gauge of the strength of a country's health care, food supply, sanitation, and public assistance support. The difference in life expectancy between developed countries and underdeveloped countries shows men and women living significantly longer in wealthier societies, which is a reflection of their social resources and organization. Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa's life expectancy is only 49.6 years, while that of high income countries average 79.2 and low income countries 60.0. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) data in Table 2 indicates that even otherwise promising states, such as Botswana and South Africa, show a less developed level of life expectancy, reflecting the grave toll that AIDS and other diseases have wreaked on those societies. Infant mortality rate (IMR), the number

of babies that survive their first year per 1,000 live births, and child mortality rates (CMR), the number of children who live to their 5th year are other common measures of health and welfare systems. Childhood survival, however, is based more upon basic medical care like immunizations, parental knowledge, and ability to combat common forms of death from illness, malnutrition, and diarrhea, so this measure is somewhat less dependent on wealth and more on community organization. Sub-Saharan Africa's regional CMR is 172 deaths per 1,000, while that of high income countries is only 7.<sup>95</sup> An IMR of 60 deaths per 1,000 births is a mark of lesser developed countries,<sup>96</sup> and many Sub-Saharan African countries exceed that. Table 2 indicates that most African countries are way in excess of the U.S. and UK IMR rate by 10 to 20 times. Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, stated that "the world's biggest killer and the greatest cause of ill health and suffering across the globe . . . is extreme poverty," a sentiment shared by many researchers and medical professionals.<sup>97</sup> In most basic demographic indicators, the people of Africa fare worst in the world.

A healthy work force is not sufficient, however, to develop an economy; the work force must also be skilled and literate to be productive. Two important measures of the level of social development are the quantity and quality of education. Quantity may be measured by how long a student attends school, because, even in mediocre schools, the longer a student attends, the more likely he or she is to learn. To measure quantity of education the UN uses the Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER), which is the ratio of all students in primary, secondary, and tertiary (college) levels of schooling compared to the official population of school age students for those three levels as established by the

Country	Life Expectancy (years)	Infant Mortality Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	Adult Literacy Total Population (percent)	Gross Enrollment Ratio (percent)
Algeria	71.7	34	69.9	73.7
Botswana	48.1	87	81.2	69.5
Chad	50.4	124	25.7	37.5
Congo, Rep	54.0	81	84.7	51.4
Ethiopia	51.8	109	35.9	42.1
Ghana	59.1	68	57.9	50.7
Kenya	52.1	79	73.6	60.6
Mauritius	72.4	13	84.3	75.3
Nigeria	46.5	100	69.1	56.2
Sierra Leone	41.8	165	34.8	44.6
South Africa	50.8	55	82.4	77.0
UK	79.0	5	99.0	93.0
USA	77.9	6	99.0	93.3
Source: UNDP, <i>Human Development Reports</i> , 2007/8, 2005 data. U.S. and UK literacy rates from CIA <i>The 2008 World Factbook</i> , 2008.				

**Table 2. Comparison of Development Using Demographic and Social Indicators.**

measured country and expressed as a percentage.<sup>98</sup> This statistic helps to show how many eligible students may actually be attending school and can be a predictor of future literacy. Table 2 shows that the highest African rates of GER are found in northern Africa, South Africa, and Mauritius at around 75 percent enrollment – below a developed country’s rate of 93-98 percent. However, these countries are not representative of most of Africa which falls far short with only 58 percent of African



children enrolled in primary education and far fewer at higher levels.<sup>99</sup> Quality of education can be measured by the student-teacher ratio or by the literacy rate, the percentage of a country's adults who can read and write in their own language.<sup>100</sup> High income societies usually provide 12 years of schooling to their students, and offer relatively easy access to higher education. This results in a typical literacy rate of above 98 percent for adult men and women. Sub-Saharan Africa's literacy is only 59.3 percent<sup>101</sup> which explains why its economic development is low, since high education and literacy levels are needed to engage in more lucrative high-value economic activities. The lower GER rates in the youngest generation also forecasts illiteracy, and a shortage of needed skills for future higher order economic activities, trapping Africans in another cycle of poverty. Together, literacy rates and GER constitute what the UN refers to as the Education Index and are important indicators of a population's current ability to participate in advanced economic activities and its potential to improve future human and economic conditions. So important are health and education to an underdeveloped population that the UN Millennium Development Goals, which aim to half absolute poverty worldwide by 2015, specifically target universal primary education, greater gender balance in schools, and reduction in the CMR as key development goals.<sup>102</sup>

Measurements of development that combine both social and demographic characteristics are urbanization and Total Fertility Rate (TFR). Both reflect population growth or distribution, but are highly influenced by cultural norms and organization. Urbanization is the total population of a country or region living within a city or its immediate surroundings (the definition

of which varies by country). Economically cities represent a dense pool of laborers needed by industry, and allow economic specialization of services like banking, insurance, and a stock exchange that are the hallmark of advanced economies. In wealthy countries, urbanization usually exceeds 75 percent of its total population. Some countries in Africa just reach 60 percent urbanization (see Table 3), but none have yet built world class manufacturing in those urban regions. At 244 million people or 30 percent of the population, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest urban population among the world's regions, but the highest city growth rate.<sup>103</sup> Another social and demographic trait is TFR (or Population Replacement Ratio), which is the number of children the average woman in a country or region will bear during her lifetime. A rate of 2.1 children is considered a long-term zero-population growth rate while a rate greater than 2.1 is considered to be indicative of a growing population and another indicator of a less developed country (see Table 3). Sub-Saharan Africa's TFR average is 5.5, significantly higher than that of middle income states (2.1) and even low income states (3.8).<sup>104</sup> That so many babies are born is an indicator that agriculture is the mainstay of an economy, low standard of health care since many children do not survive, low level of government support so that children act as old age insurance, and cultural preference for large families. The negative aspects of large families are that they disperse the concentration of available funds, delaying a surplus of massed capital needed for development. High urbanization reinforces a low TFR, since city dwellers rarely have the room or economic motivation to have large families. Social and demographic indicators such as urbanization and TFR, are just a few among a host

of other economic, social, and demographic measures used to better understand a specific area's development through a broader perspective. Social and demographic traits often are the foundation upon which a modern economy is built, and are therefore excellent indicators to supplement economic measures of development. Since health, education, and urbanization require community resources and organization, they are also signs of how much wealth and ability a community has to fulfill these aspirations.

Since 1990 the UN has published the HDI as a shorthand single aggregate measure of human development to facilitate chronological and lateral comparisons. The HDI includes the economic measure of GDP-PPP to determine standard of living; a social measure using the Educational Index including both GER and literacy rates; and a demographic dimension for health in the form of life expectancy. Combined, these provide a broader index ranging from a value of 1 (best score) to 0 (dismal) to show human and economic development levels (Table 3). Sub-Saharan Africa ranks lowest among the world's regions with an HDI of 0.493, due to having the world's lowest standard of living and worst health and education levels. The region of North Africa, including Egypt, rates significantly higher with an HDI of 0.740.<sup>105</sup> In comparison, the regions of Anglo-America, Japan, and Western Europe each place around 0.93-0.94 in HDI<sup>106</sup> and among middle and low income countries at 0.776 and 0.579, respectively. Although often cited for its broadness, even the HDI has limitations since it includes just a few important measures of the many available, and thus still gives a less than comprehensive picture.

Country	Urbanization (percent population)	Total Fertility Rate (births per woman)	Human Development Index (ranking in world)
Algeria	40.3	2.5	0.733 (104)
Botswana	57.4	3.2	0.654 (124)
Chad	25.3	6.5	0.388 (170)
Congo, Rep	60.2	4.8	0.548 (139)
Ethiopia	16.0	5.8	0.406 (169)
Ghana	47.8	4.4	0.553 (135)
Kenya	20.7	5.0	0.521 (148)
Mauritius	42.4	1.9	0.804 ( 65)
Nigeria	48.2	5.8	0.470 (158)
Sierra Leone	40.7	6.5	0.366 (177, bottom)
South Africa	59.3	2.8	0.674 (121)
Sudan	40.8	4.8	0.526 (147)
UK	98.7	1.7	0.946 ( 16)
USA	80.8	2.0	0.949 ( 12)
Note: HDI and urbanization is 2005 data, TFR is 2000-05 data. Urbanization data is based on national definitions of an urban area and vary by country.			
Source: UNDP, <i>Human Development Reports</i> , 2007-08.			

**Table 3. Comparison of Development Using Urbanization, TFR, and HDI Indicators.**

The UNDP's 2007 *Human Development Report* judges its own HDI measure. "It does not, for example, include important indicators such as gender or income inequality and more difficult to measure indicators like respect for human rights and political freedoms. What it does provide is a broadened prism for viewing

human progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being.”<sup>107</sup> Because it accounts for at least one significant economic, social, and demographic measure, the HDI is a better balanced, although still limited, single indication of economic and human development levels. Even when this measure is used, Sub-Saharan Africa is still perceived to be the least developed region in the world.

### **Measuring Other Development Indicators in Africa.**

To add a deeper understanding of the economic and human development of a state, additional indexes may be used to compensate for the acknowledged weaknesses in the HDI. The Gender Development Index (GDI, see Table 4), which compares the level of human development between women and men, is one such method using the same criteria found in the HDI. The greater the disparity between men and women in these measures, the lower the GDI. For example, even though both relatively prosperous, Botswana and Mauritius have about the same overall literacy rate (from Table 2), the GDI indicator for Mauritius is reduced since its literacy figures are skewed (Table 4) with 88.2 percent of males literate compared to 80.5 percent of females, while Botswana’s is more balanced at 80.4 percent males and 81.8 percent females although both are notably high for African societies).<sup>108</sup> In parts of Africa where overall literacy runs at half or less of the population, for example in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, or Chad, female literacy is only half to a quarter that of males. The Gross Enrollment Ratio confirms this current trend and bodes slow future improvement for African women overall with only 25 to 75 percent of age-eligible females enrolled in school, lower than

that of males. This means that the female half of the population of these countries have less opportunity to reach the levels needed to contribute to economic development than males have, which retards growth potential since not all available human resources are used. Such differences may result from a fiscal allocation system where limited available resources are expended mainly on males, or may have a cultural bias where fiscal resources are spent elsewhere rather than advancing the education of females. In many African economies, lower education directly results in lower earned income for females (Table 4) by a difference of two to three times. When they can work outside the home, less education often means women remain in menial or entry level jobs and cannot progress to higher level technical or management positions. Lack of education also reduces the opportunity for women to hold elected or appointed positions in government. Among the development measures, African females fare better than their male counterparts only in life expectancy. But this is also true everywhere in the world where rudimentary modern medical care and public health are practiced. Not surprisingly, of all of the regions in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa ranks lowest in GDI,<sup>109</sup> and of all the countries, Niger is lowest at 0.278.<sup>110</sup> Such a low GDI indicates that African women have less influence in the affairs of their communities, which in turn hinders economic and human development.

Other inequalities found in the HDI are also balanced by examining factors addressing income distribution and human freedom—each is a factor influencing economic and human development as well as stability. With income inequality, a state may have a relatively high GDP per capita, but the rich elite may be the primary beneficiary, while the rest of the

population is significantly below the national average and suffer inadequate education and health care. The poverty line is an absolute way of measuring such disparity, based on the definition of being poor in each country. A relatively easy way to measure the degree of income inequality, to allow comparisons across borders, is a Gini Index used by the UNDP as a ratio of values of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning perfect inequality (one person earns everything, and the rest nothing).

Country	Earned Income (Estimated US\$) Male / Female	Life Expectancy (in Years) Male / Female	Adult Literacy ( Percent Total Pop) Male / Female	Gender Development Index (rank)
Algeria	10,515 / 3,546	70.4 / 73.0	79.6 / 60.1	0.720 ( 94)
Botswana	19,094 / 5,913	47.6 / 48.4	80.4 / 81.8	0.639 (108)
Chad	1,735 / 1,126	49.0 / 51.8	40.8 / 12.8	0.370 (151)
Congo, Rep	1,691 / 841	52.8 / 55.2	90.5 / 79.0	0.540 (119)
Ethiopia	1,316 / 796	50.5 / 53.1	50.0 / 22.8	0.393 (148)
Ghana	2,893 / 2,056	58.7 / 59.5	66.4 / 49.8	0.549 (116)
Kenya	1,354 / 1,126	51.1 / 53.1	77.0 / 70.2	0.521 (126)
Mauritius	18,098 / 7,407	69.1 / 75.8	88.2 / 80.5	0.804 ( 65)
Nigeria	1,592 / 652	46.6 / 47.1	78.2 / 60.1	0.456 (138)
Sierra Leone	1,114 / 507	40.2 / 43.4	46.7 / 24.2	0.320 (156)
South Africa	15,446 / 6,927	49.5 / 52.0	84.1 / 80.9	0.667 (106)
UK	40,000 /26,242	76.7 / 81.2	99.0 / 99.0	0.944 ( 10)
USA	40,000 /25,005	75.2 / 80.4	99.0 / 99.0	0.937 ( 16)
Note: all figures based on 2005 data. U.S. and UK male Earned Income shows most allowed.				
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08. U.S. and UK literacy rates from CIA The 2008 World Factbook, 2007 data.				

**Table 4. Comparison of Development Measures Using Gender Development Index Measures.**

The World Bank ranked Namibia as having the world's most unequal distribution of wealth in 2006 with a Gini index of 74.3, a result of its white minority owning most of the country's land and commercial farms.<sup>111</sup> Botswana and South Africa also have unequal income distribution for similar reasons, explaining why Africa, with Latin America, has the world's most unbalanced income distribution.<sup>112</sup> Anecdotal evidence from oil rich Nigeria shows that despite suffering a net decline in GNI per capita over past decades, six of the world's 100 richest people are Nigerian, and each one is politically powerful.<sup>113</sup> Economic inequality often is associated with political inequality in Africa, leaving the poor not only destitute but powerless to change their situation.

Attempts to better balance the HDI using more subjective factors such as political freedom have created measures like the UNDP's Human Freedom Index (HFI). First tabulated in 1991 to address the lack of human rights when measuring development through the HDI, the UNDP concluded there was a high correlation between human development and human freedom.<sup>114</sup> Some political freedoms, such as property rights, may directly contribute to economic development.<sup>115</sup> Political freedom bolsters human development, and human development reinforces political freedom. However, the UNDP HFI is no longer tabulated, probably because it proved to be too politically contentious. For the past 35 years the NGO Freedom House has offered a similar index on a 1 to 7 scale to measure political rights and civil liberties (where 1 is free and 7 is not free, see Table 5). In its 2006 analysis, 46 countries were rated in the 6 or 7 category for political rights, and 19 of those were found on the African continent. That means Africa is host to nearly half of the world's repressive regimes but represents



only a little over a quarter of the world's states. Some blame the cause for such abuses on a lack of economic resources resulting in a "human rights rationing."<sup>116</sup> Indeed, among Africa's three wealthiest states in terms of GDP-PPP and HDI, Mauritius, Botswana, and South Africa, are also found the freest societies in Africa – but there are exceptions. For example, Algeria is ranked second in HDI and fourth in per capita wealth which are two indicators of economic development. Yet Algeria is still categorized by Freedom House as not free. In part, lack of emphasis on freedom may be due to African aspirations that value democracy more for its potential to deliver necessities like water, shelter, and education than for its freedoms.<sup>117</sup> Although not entirely correlated to economic development, some factors such as income distribution and human freedom do offer a fuller understanding of a country's development situation.

The economic, social, and demographic characteristics introduced so far are just a few of many possible ways of measuring development so as to gain a more holistic view of economic conditions. The more characteristics that are evaluated, including some of the material gains examined in this paragraph, the better is the resulting analysis of a country's economic state of affairs. One such economic factor to consider is productivity, defined as the value of a particular product or service compared to the amount of labor needed to produce it. Workers in developed countries have access to tools and capabilities through capital that make their work more productive and generate more wealth than that of workers in underdeveloped countries who rely on less efficient human and animal power.<sup>118</sup> One characteristic of productivity tracked

Country	Income Inequality (0=equality)	Political Rights/Civil Liberties/ Freedom Index
Algeria	35.3	6 / 5 / Not Free
Botswana	60.5	2 / 2 / Free
Chad	n/a	6 / 5 / Not Free
Congo, Rep	n/a	6 / 6 / Not Free
Ethiopia	30.0	5 / 5 / Part Free
Ghana	40.8	1 / 2 / Free
Kenya	42.5	3 / 3 / Part Free
Mauritius	n/a	1 / 1 / Free
Nigeria	43.7	4 / 4 / Part Free
Sudan	n/a	7 / 7 / Not Free
Sierra Leone	62.9	4 / 3 / Part Free
South Africa	57.8	1 / 2 / Free
UK	36.0	1 / 1 / Free
USA	40.8	1 / 1 / Free
Note: Income Inequality data is from 2005, and Political Rights data from 2006.		
Sources: Income Inequality data from UNDP, <i>Human Development Reports</i> , 2007-0/8. Political Rights/Civil Liberties from <i>Freedom in World Country Ratings</i> , Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006.		

**Table 5. Comparison of Development Using Income Inequality and Freedom Measurements.**

by the UNDP is Electricity Consumption Per Capita, which tells how much power is used to run tools and equipment at work and home. Africa's most industrialized and wealthiest societies, here represented by Mauritius, South Africa, and Algeria, are also the ones that consume the most electricity. Electricity consumption, along with Internet and cell phone

usage (see Table 6), portend a large investment in physical infrastructure suggesting national wealth and confidence to invest due to a perception of future stability. Consumer goods such as appliances, transportation, computers, and phones are also essential to a modern economy since they allow access to jobs, services, and information.

Consumption of such goods is a result of high economic development, but they in turn promote even higher levels of development through their increased efficiency and availability of more workers. Such gadgets also indicate a societal proclivity for embracing change, which is another prerequisite for economic advancement along Western norms. Countries with more than 500 telephones, 400 motor vehicles, and 300 Internet users per 1,000 people are more developed, while those with less than 100 of each per 1,000 are considered underdeveloped.<sup>119</sup> Such consumer goods, like those in Table 6, reinforce earlier conclusions that categorize all of Africa as underdeveloped, but do differentiate Mauritius, South Africa, and Algeria as the more developed within Africa. One bright spot for Sub-Saharan Africa is that its regional cellular phone use average of 130 per 1,000 people is almost twice that of other low income countries, which may suggest a willingness to embrace technology, although the number of Internet users at 26 per thousand is half that of the other low income countries, which averages 45.<sup>120</sup> Such differences in communication may be explained by the fact that a cellular network is cheaper to join and requires less infrastructure and skill than Internet usage. Indicators such as productivity through energy and goods consumption are just a few among a host of other economic, social, and demographic measures used to better understand Africa's low economic development level.

Country	Electricity Consumption Per Capita (kilowatt-hrs)	Internet Users (per 1,000)	Cell Phone Subscribers (per 1,000)
Algeria	899	58	416
Botswana	n/a	34	466
Chad	11	4	22
Congo, Rep	229	13	123
Ethiopia	36	2	6
Ghana	289	18	129
Kenya	169	32	135
Mauritius	1,775	146	574
Nigeria	157	38	141
Sierra Leone	24	2	22
South Africa	4,818	109	724
Sudan	116	77	50
UK	6,756	473	1,088
USA	14,240	630	680
Notes: Figures based on 2005 data, except Electricity Consumption, which are 2004 data.			
Sources: UNDP, <i>Human Development Reports</i> , 2007-08.			

**Table 6. Comparison of Development Using Consumption Indicators.**

### **Economic Measures Summary.**

Development encompasses more than just economic improvement; it is also composed of social and demographic advances, political freedoms, economic opportunity, and even perhaps a sense of collective contentment. Development therefore requires both

material wealth and nonmaterial enhancement because they reinforce one another in bettering society. When gauging improvement, development measures have their limitations in that each only partly describes this complex phenomenon. For the best understanding of development, different perspectives are needed, including economic measures such as a country's GNP per capita, GDP-PPP, income equality, and consumption of goods; social measures including GER, literacy, urbanization, gender equality, and political rights; and the demographic characteristics of life expectancy, CMR, IMR, and TFR among others. For ease of use, these measures can be grouped into a single indicator, such as the HDI or GDI, but even those do not explain fully the situation unless considered with other trends. Africa's development may also not completely follow Western norms, which emphasized production of goods and services using the 20th century model that burdened future generations and the environment.<sup>121</sup> Despite reliance on quantifiable measurements and a Western-centric view of what development is, Africa still presents a picture of low economic and human development in both absolute terms and relative to other regions of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa's HDI of 0.491 lags behind the HDI average of the world's low income states at 0.570,<sup>122</sup> making it the poorest of the poor. Even worse, the trend is towards more economic poverty. The number of people living in extreme poverty (earning less than U.S. \$1 a day) has increased in most of Sub-Saharan Africa since 2000 when 189 countries pledged to promote development, freedom, and peace through the Millennium Development Goals. In fact, none of the eight major human development goals for Africa are on track to be reached by the target date of 2015.<sup>123</sup> Such gaps may seriously undermine the

ability of African states to attain stability and security or to improve their governance, which is an ominous sign for the United States and the rest of the world.

In Africa, economic growth is not necessarily about gaining more or better material possessions, desirable as this may be in reducing poverty. Economic growth is just as concerned with the intelligent sustainable growth that also ensures demographic and societal development with it. A World Bank report emphasizes:

Development is about improving the quality of people's lives, expanding their ability to shape their own futures. This generally calls for higher per capita income, but it involves much more. It involves more equitable education and job opportunities. Greater gender equality. Better health and nutrition. A cleaner, more sustainable natural environment. A more impartial judicial and legal system. Broader civil and political freedoms. A richer cultured life.<sup>124</sup>

As late as the 1960s, the Republic of Korea was also afflicted with many of the same problems faced by most African states today. However, by 2007 South Korea's GNI of U.S. \$410 million was larger than all of the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa combined at \$310 million.<sup>125</sup> South Korea "is now a model of development as one of the world's most prosperous Newly Industrialized Countries. . . ."<sup>126</sup> The African states are the last to start this climb, but the models and assistance needed for economic, social, and demographic development are available if the countries of Africa can put their own fundamentals in order. To further explain why such poverty persists despite native advantages including substantial natural resources and a relatively low population density, and to explain how the United States and other non-African nations can help Africa

develop, the next section analyzes some of the causes responsible for hobbling the African people in their human progress and possible solutions to improve the situation.

## **AFRICA'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES**

### **Economic Activities and Development.**

Although a society's security, welfare, and development are more than an agglomeration of its economic activities, it is the economy that is the foundation for social, demographic, political, and material gains. A country's economy provides the funding for new wells, clinics, schools, ballots, and the income to buy life enhancing goods and services. Africa lags the rest of the world in development in large part because its economies are the smallest and least productive in the world. This comparative global disadvantage has grown rapidly since the great age of European discovery began in the 1450s. At that time, the difference between Europe and Africa was small, with Europeans impressed by the African empires' wealth, organization, and strength so that Europeans traded with Africans as equals and the Portuguese entered into alliances with African states.<sup>127</sup> Today, despite the often negative indicators of Africa's situation, there are some success stories on the continent and a general, although not universal, trend toward economic growth averaging over 5 percent annually between 2000 and 2007.<sup>128</sup> It is necessary to determine the important factors that are the basis of this success in order to continue this progress. Since its inclusion into the world economy by Arab traders in the 11th century and European merchants in the 15th century,<sup>129</sup> Africa's economy

has been grounded primarily on agriculture and has been a key source of the world's raw materials. Early European names for parts of the continent – the Grain Coast, Gold Coast, and Ivory Coast – attest to these enduring relationships. These resources were a main cause for European imperialism and why some leaders today accuse outside powers of continuing their control in Africa through a form of neo-colonialism. Unlike Europe, however, Africa's main economic activities have over the centuries remained the same primary ones. It is the continued reliance on such economic pursuits that may explain why Africa is economically underdeveloped. In Africa, farming remains the most important economic activity, and mineral and energy resources its biggest exports. Such activities are the most basic form of human production to meet fundamental needs, but tend to advance economic development very slowly. Elsewhere in the world, economic, social, political, and demographic improvement has been fueled by engaging in higher order economic activities such as manufacturing, building, and production (secondary economic activities), or services to and from individuals, businesses, and government (tertiary economic activities) to include communications, transportation, education, research, and personal services. This section examines Africa's primary, secondary, and tertiary economic activities, to show how the reliance on the primary activities has put it at a disadvantage, but how better administration and governance, diversification into higher order economic activities, and foreign assistance can leverage human and natural resources to further develop Africa and enhance its security and stability.

There are several components that contribute to development, especially economic development: the natural environment, people, and culture. The natural



environment is particularly important to the success of primary economic activities,<sup>130</sup> which include agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and gathering, grazing, mining, and drilling. These primary activities limit economic development through the vagaries of physical distribution, which expose such activities to risk and shortages. Primary economic activities also earn less from human input and capital for the overall cost of the commodity than higher order activities. Less added-value derives less profit from primary commodities than from manufactured goods or services. Often, the economic value of these commodities depends on the rise and fall of international demand, since domestic and regional demand in Africa for its own commercial primary products is small. Economic policies of industrialized countries are made in their own favor, which makes participation in the global economy by poorer countries less advantageous. Even occasional high world-wide primary commodity prices, as occurred in the 1970s and in the 2000s, may not contribute enough to economic and human development over time since inevitable drops make investment in such activities risky, and their roller-coaster economic returns are too unreliable for modern development schemes that depend upon stability. Thus, throughout history and around the world there has been a strong correlation between a predominant engagement in primary economic activities and relatively low economic and human development of a region or country. Although the most basic of human pursuits, the inconsistent returns, less-predictable supply, lower added-value, and dependence on outside demand for primary commodities like food, fibers, timber, hydrocarbons, and mineral resources, make primary economic activities a weaker and less reliable means by which to advance economic development.

## **Agriculture.**

Workers who engage in agriculture for the primary purpose of feeding their families are considered subsistence farmers and are at the lowest end of development. They typically employ small or desolate plots of land using little machinery, capital, or fertilizer. Subsistence agriculture may include intensive farming such as rice growing, slash and burn methods in the jungle, and pastoralism. Subsistence farmers engage sporadically in the national economy and do not contribute in an appreciable way to a state's tax base or economic development. A country is considered developed if it employs less than 10 percent of its labor in agriculture, and is underdeveloped if more than half are farmers.<sup>131</sup> "A high percentage of agricultural workers in a country indicates that most of its people must spend their days producing food for their own survival . . . not in more wealth creating enterprises like manufacturing and services."<sup>132</sup> On average, African agriculture employs about two-thirds of all workers, but accounted for less than a quarter of GDP in 1999 according to the World Bank.<sup>133</sup> Table 7 shows 80 percent of the work force in Ethiopia, Chad, and Sudan is engaged in agriculture, with 75 percent for Kenya and 70 percent for Nigeria. The relatively low contribution of agriculture to the GDP for so much human involvement demonstrates the relative inefficiency of subsistence farming in the state economy. Drought, disease, and pests make all types of farming risky, but especially subsistence farming, which has fewer resources and depth with which to mitigate such disasters. The poverty of subsistence farming is compounded by a growing population

that often accompanies traditional farming, so less food is available per capita. Subsistence farmers must therefore adopt more intense or more modern farming methods, or face possible dire consequences such as famine,<sup>134</sup> which has plagued Sub-Saharan Africa for several decades. The need to adapt "is all the greater because the AIDS pandemic is cutting down the number of agricultural workers in Africa, reducing Africa's ability not only to feed itself but also to cope with periodic natural calamities."<sup>135</sup> An extreme consequence of subsistence agriculture overburdened by population growth is evident in Rwanda, Africa's very agriculture-dependent and most densely populated state.<sup>136</sup> Paul Magnarella, former President of the Association of Third World Studies, concludes that the cause of the "Rwandan genocide was the increasing imbalance in land, food, and people that led to malnutrition, hunger, periodic famine, and fierce competition for farming land. Rwanda's leaders chose to respond to these conditions by eliminating the Tutsi portion of the population as well as their Hutu political rivals."<sup>137</sup> It is difficult for primary economic activities to significantly advance economic development because of the risk and low economic return from such commodities. Subsistence agriculture remains the predominant form of economic activity in Africa, but contributes the least to an economy and tax base. This condition plays a large part in underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in its instability.

For this mainstay of Africa's economy to overcome hunger and contribute to society's development, a surplus in food production is a requirement. A surplus will not only feed Sub-Saharan Africa's population, but generate revenue by selling the surplus, and allow unneeded labor to engage in higher order economic

activities.<sup>138</sup> Elsewhere in the world similar cultures were converted from subsistence farming into the modest base upon which more developed economies were built. Since the 1940s, the engine for such transformation has been the Green Revolution, originally a U.S.-Mexican project to attain food security by developing high-yield, disease-resistant grain varieties.<sup>139</sup> Through scientific research and the technological application of “mechanized equipment, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, and hybrid seeds . . . yield[s of] two to four times more than traditional crops” were realized.<sup>140</sup> Despite its success in Asia and Latin America, the Green Revolution has not promoted a dramatic increase in food in Africa.<sup>141</sup> One reason is that African tuber staples, cassava, yams, and cocoyams, are not part of the diet of other underdeveloped parts of the world and were not addressed. The industrial nature of the Green Revolution crops grown in parts of Africa, such as rice, requires heavy capital investment for machinery, chemical enhancements, specialized seeds, and access to larger plots of land.<sup>142</sup> Consequently, these Green Revolution crops are not as suitable for poverty-stricken Africans. The need for basic literacy to read manuals and understand more complicated methods is also helpful, as is a willingness to embrace change. However, the prerequisites for capital, land, and education are often out of reach of most Africans, creating a dilemma that prevents them from advancing. To gain the resources needed to participate in the Green Revolution, farmers may depend on government or international assistance, or incrementally transform into commercial agriculture by growing food for international trade.<sup>143</sup> Whichever way, “increasing agricultural productivity is the engine of economic development in agricultural economies. Agricultural

productivity improvement and rural development are also the most effective ways to improve conditions for poor people.”<sup>144</sup> The Green Revolution is a proven way of moving towards higher development, but initiating that change requires assistance.

Unlike subsistence agriculture, commercial crops are grown primarily for sale and depend on capital driven inputs like machinery, chemical enhancements, and large plots of land—all of which increases crop production while reducing the percentage of laborers involved.<sup>145</sup> Such produce may include grains, fruits and vegetables, nuts, fibers, meat and dairy, timber, fish, or more of nature’s bounty that grows on land or sea and whose harvest exceeds local needs. Malawi offers a classic example of commercial agriculture through tobacco, which accounts for 70 percent of all of its export revenues. However, Malawi is also a caution against using mono-agriculture to fuel economic development, since so much needed revenue depends on the survival of a single crop and the vagaries of global competition.<sup>146</sup> Perhaps for this reason Malawi places low in the HDI (at 0.437 ranking 164 of 177 countries), and last world-wide in GDP-PPP, earning only U.S. \$667 per capita annually.<sup>147</sup> Ethiopia’s coffee crop is also a major part of its foreign revenue, which has stunted Ethiopia’s economic growth because of recent droughts, exacerbated by a simmering war with Eritrea, and depressed international demand.<sup>148</sup> Uganda’s exports depend upon primary commodities too, accounting for 83 percent, but it “diversified its agricultural sector to include nontraditional exports, such as fruits, vegetables, tobacco, and flowers . . .” —a safer strategy.<sup>149</sup> In Table 7, the Primary Exports category is an indicator of the amount of commercial agriculture (but also mineral and energy resources and

logging, depending on which state is examined) sold abroad. For Ethiopia, 60 percent of its exports are from commercial crops like coffee; but that excludes the vast number of subsistence farmers who grow few cash crops.<sup>150</sup> Another typical example is Ghana's 35 percent of export revenue from agriculture, mainly cocoa, in which few of Ghana's 55 percent of agricultural workers participate.<sup>151</sup> Commercial agriculture is currently only a boon to an elite portion of Africa's population.

Commercial and subsistence agriculture often exist side by side in a dual economic system, which explains why some countries have both a high percentage of workers engaged in agriculture and yet depend very much on exports from agricultural goods. As noted earlier, such commercial enterprises may be the engine for gaining resources needed to transform subsistence agriculture through a new Green Revolution, whereby "foreign innovations are first adapted on large scale farms . . . before descending to the level of small holder."<sup>152</sup> The dark side to a dual structure is that the wealthy elite who gain the resources to be commercial farmers or ranchers also have the power to control poor subsistence farmers or drive them to marginal land that is quickly overworked<sup>153</sup> before a transition occurs. On the other hand, during the 2000s, Zimbabwe demonstrated the negative impact on food security and exports of unwisely breaking up large commercial farms. Within families, such dualism also exists, which is a legacy of colonial policies and reinforces gender inequality today.<sup>154</sup> For example, women are often relegated to traditional subsistence farming to feed the family, growing up to 80 percent of Africa's total food supply, while men work for wages or grow commercial crops as part of the transition from subsistence farming.<sup>155</sup> Creating surplus food in

agriculture-dependent Africa is the key to economic development. Participating in a new Green Revolution is one way to transition to more lucrative commercial agriculture and assure access to food, but for success a balanced transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture must occur.

Since agriculture is crucial to the well-being of Africans, its proper management is the key place from which to develop the continent's economies and societies. Africa's agricultural underperformance is a function of the region's corruption of the dual economic system, climate and bad weather, and institutional factors such as low levels of investment, instability, inefficient use of resources, and mal-governance.<sup>156</sup> The antidote to these problems is better national governance and administration and international assistance to prod Africa's stagnant development trend. Maintaining basic internal stability, external peace, transparency, and representative government are necessary first steps in gaining local and foreign investment in agriculture, but one that many African governments seem unable to achieve. To encourage change towards these goals, the United States started the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which offers "a 50 percent increase in development assistance for those countries meeting its qualifications . . . [which] stress good governance, peace, security, the rule of law, human rights. . . ." <sup>157</sup> In Africa, Benin, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal have gained eligibility in MCA for their improvement efforts. With basic good governance in place, external assistance could help to ensure that commercial agriculture becomes a boost to development and not just another form of supporting the elite. For instance, professional agricultural planning that respects or restores the environment is crucial to increase production and

Country	Employment In Agriculture (% total employ)	Primary Exports (% exports)	GDP from Agriculture (% of total)	Primary Economic Activity Exports
Algeria	14	98	8	Petroleum, natural gas
Botswana	n/a	13	2	Diamonds, copper, nickel, soda, ash
Chad	80	n/a	22	Oil, cattle, cotton, gum arabic
Congo, Rep	n/a	n/a	6	Petroleum, lumber, sugar, cocoa
Ethiopia	80	89	49	Coffee, qat, gold, livestock, oilseed
Ghana	56	88	37	Gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, manganese
Kenya	75	79	24	Tea, horticultural products coffee, fish
Mauritius	9	29	5	Sugar, cut flowers, fish
Nigeria	70	98	18	Petroleum, cocoa, rubber
Sierra Leone	n/a	93	49	Diamonds, rutile, cocoa, fish
South Africa	9	43	2	Gold, diamonds, platinum, metals
Sudan	80	99	31	Petroleum, cotton, sesame, livestock
UK	1	18	1	
USA	1	15	1	
Notes: Data based on most recent years from 2000-07. Botswana, Congo, and Sierra Leone's agriculture employment data are not available, but each at least exceeds half of the work force.				
Sources: Primary Exports: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08. Employment, GDP from Agriculture, and Exports: CIA's <i>World Factbook</i> , 2008.				

**Table 7. Comparison of Primary Economic Employment and Production Indicators.**



ensure that any gains made can be sustained for future generations. State governments should be proactive through reforestation, re-vegetation, soil conservation, and through their organizational responses to problems, rather than a reactive posture as has usually been the case.<sup>158</sup> Such steps will mitigate the effects of adverse weather and somewhat prepare for changes in the environment. Since farmers and state governments often lack the resources and capital to spur a Green Revolution and more efficient commercial agriculture, foreign aid may prove very useful at the start. One example of such assistance is the U.S. Government's Africa Seeds of Hope Act which aims to increase agricultural productivity and rural development through food security for subsistence agriculture and higher income for commercial endeavors. Through this act, USAID consults with the rural poor to establish micro credit with private entities and NGOs, extends the benefits of the Green Revolution to African crops, enables increased flexibility in food aid, and ensures accountability towards progress.<sup>159</sup> Other international, foreign government, and nongovernmental organizations are also active in similar initiatives, and all efforts should be cooperatively optimized. A partnership of African governments willing to improve governance and international assistance is one way to help continue Africa's development.

A second way to promote development and to establish food security for Africans while creating a surplus of commercial crops for international trade is by enhancing the demand-side of agriculture. International demand for African agricultural products may better ensure that development is sustainable in the long run and does not simply continue ineffective aid and grants. The United States and EU could play

a much larger, if more controversial, role by opening up their domestic markets to African agricultural goods, similar to the access that African manufactured products have. This would eliminate a World Bank estimated U.S. \$270 billion of trade-distorting price supports, and spur African economies.<sup>160</sup> However, every change made to the precarious balance of Africa's economies needs to be carefully considered. In such a case, African farmers

would require substantial financial, human, and physical investment in developing land for growing agricultural products, and agro-industrial development for processing, packaging, meeting health and sanitary standards, and marketing to the supermarkets of the world. It would require human capital and expertise in farming, food processing, and food product marketing of precisely the kind that Africa has been carelessly exporting.<sup>161</sup>

Uganda's past policy and Zimbabwe's present policy of land reappropriation have driven away much of the human capital needed to achieve such a goal, whereas Kenya's and Namibia's policies have better retained the needed expertise, although perpetuating other problems. Developing agriculture is the key to advancing Africa's economic and human development. To achieve these goals, African governments must govern better, and ensure an efficient and equitable transition to food security and commercial agriculture. International assistance can spur the transformation by offering aid to initiate the process and opening markets to African products. This may be the key piece in a complex puzzle of helping Africa develop security and stability.

## **Extractive Resources.**

Just as important as agriculture in underpinning Africa's economies is its vast mineral and energy wealth. These are primary commodities that may be the foundation upon which to develop a society or economy if properly managed, but often they are not. Because Africa is relatively land and resource abundant but underachieving in human efforts, natural resources play a larger role in its fortunes than in any other region except the Middle East.<sup>162</sup> Between 1965 and 2000 "most of the growth that has taken place in export trade has come primarily from extractive processes and agriculture" with primary commodities accounting for more than 90 percent of foreign revenues in many African countries.<sup>163</sup> These resources are "naturally occurring, exploitable material that society perceives as useful to its economic and material well-being."<sup>164</sup> Some resources are renewable, like solar, wind, and geo-thermal energy. Africa has much potential to harness these for its benefit, using its mighty rivers like the Congo or Niger to generate electricity, but also through numerous small rivers such as Liberia's St. Paul River, which once supplied half of that country's electricity. Although Africans desperately need cheap clean energy from these renewable sources, their establishment has been slow and underfunded compared to nonrenewable resources, which are exportable and of greater interest to overseas companies and governments that invest in Africa's infrastructure. Nonrenewable resources include metallic and nonmetallic minerals and fossil fuels. To be useful, natural resources must be accessible, exploitable, and economically needed. Accessible refers to the distribution and occurrence of a resource.

Many African states have little or less-than-adequate natural resources and cannot depend on this avenue for development revenue. Exploitability requires technology to recover and fashion these resources in an economically viable way. Although some resources are relatively easy to obtain, such as the alluvial diamonds of Sierra Leone and Liberia (a characteristic that fueled the civil wars in both countries), most need capital, technology, and expertise, usually requiring the intervention of foreign interests. Economic need is based on the recognition that a resource has value and fills a niche within an economy, generating trade or industry. Natural resources can be more influential in speeding development than agriculture because the payoff is greater, but with increased risks. The geographical distribution of natural resources give them a value that rises and falls with international demand, so thereby they may be unreliable sources of funding for development plans. The requirement for foreign demand and assistance to recover and use these resources also means that a state government often has less control over its fate than is true of more localized agriculture. Because of the advanced level of technology and expertise involved in extraction activities, their potential return to spur development is higher because of the capital cost and value added, but usually rewards only an elite fraction of the population unless government intervenes to spread the wealth. Raw materials and agriculture alone can be used for development, as coal and iron ore were used in the UK to start the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. Other European countries, the United States, and Japan followed suit with an increasing need for raw materials to continue their development. This appetite, however, resulted in imperialism in Africa and other parts of

the world, thereby inhibiting further development in the newly colonized regions.<sup>165</sup> Natural resources offer more potential to enhance development than agriculture, if properly governed, but to a lesser extent than industry or services. Below are examples of how natural resources are contributing to development of African nations and the pitfalls they pose to the development process.

Natural resources in some countries have remained the primary source for funding economic and human development, resulting in both notable successes and negative effects.<sup>166</sup> From 2000 to 2007, oil exporting countries led Africa's economies with an impressive 7 percent growth rate.<sup>167</sup> Gabon is a typical country benefiting from this trend. Well into the 1970s, Gabon was an exporter of timber, gold, iron ore, and manganese, but the discovery of oil catapulted Gabon's growth. Oil, the commodity that accounts for 50 percent of GDP and 80 percent of export revenues, caused the GDP-PPP to rise to an impressive U.S. \$13,800 in 2007. Gabon's national income per capita based on oil is near the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and is four times that of most other African states.<sup>168</sup> On the negative side, Gabon's rapid growth has also produced a high income inequality level, which keeps power in a small group and most of its population poor and uneducated. Oil also dominates Nigeria's economy at 25 percent of GDP and 95 percent of exports. Although oil revenues produced respectable growth from 1965 to 1982, the GNI per capita since then has dropped from U.S. \$1,110 to \$300 in 2000. This demonstrates the inherent transitory nature of riches from natural commodities. The drop in GNI was further exacerbated by the government's mismanagement of its economy, high population growth (TFR of 5.41 in 2007), and ethnic divisions—

typical of development problems confronted by other African states.<sup>169</sup>

Not only has Nigeria's oil production failed to increase the general welfare of its people, but in some cases it had a direct negative impact by harming agriculture through polluting the land, and diverting funds from agricultural development.<sup>170</sup> In the oil producing Niger River delta, the deprivations from inequality and environmental degradation have ignited an insurgency, which in turn disrupts oil production and limits overall economic growth.<sup>171</sup> Natural resource wealth has stoked instability and violence in other places, too. Impoverished Chad is currently hoping for oil reserves to provide an economic boost through foreign investment. However, internal ethnic unrest and cross border incursions produced a negative 1.3 percent growth rate in 2007<sup>172</sup> due in part to violent disruption of oil production and mal-governance.<sup>173</sup> Even where a government genuinely tries to develop its population through its resources, it may not succeed. Algeria earns 60 percent of its budget revenue and 95 percent of its export earnings from hydrocarbons as the world's 4th largest natural gas exporter and 14th in oil. Yet the government's attempt to diversify the economy so as to reduce high unemployment and raise living standards has yet to be successful, with reforms slowed by corruption and bureaucratic inertia.<sup>174</sup> The perceived blessings of oil may backfire in other ways, too. Since the 1980s in the Republic of Congo rising oil revenues have been the main source to finance large-scale development resulting in a substantial GDP growth averaging 5 percent annually. To do so, however, the "government has mortgaged a substantial portion of its oil earnings through oil-backed loans that have contributed to a growing debt

burden and chronic revenue shortfalls.”<sup>175</sup> Congo’s success is also threatened by the cyclical nature of oil prices, internal instability, and incomplete government and economic reform.<sup>176</sup> The potential of African natural resources have only been partially realized in helping to advance the world’s least developed region. Throughout Africa, the benefits of natural resources are diminished because of many of the same recurring problems found in agriculture: the cyclical nature of the demand for natural resources, poor government management in using the earnings from raw materials, internal instability that actually may be caused by the presence of such wealth, and population growth that simply outstrips the economic growth rate. Despite these hindrances, resource rich states are envied, since many other African states are bereft of natural resources and the potential of those resources to spur development.

Natural resources can be both a help and hindrance to development, so analyzing Africa’s sources of natural wealth beyond hydrocarbons is instructive. Oil and natural gas-poor African countries can sometimes rely on other resources to generate foreign revenue. Guinea, for example, is a major producer of bauxite and gem stones that, along with other primary products, make up 75 percent of its exports, but do not advance a low HDI of 0.456, ranking 160th in the world.<sup>177</sup> Zambia is an important world supplier of cobalt and copper, a major portion of its 91 percent of primary exports, but has an even lower HDI of 0.434 and ranks 165th in the world.<sup>178</sup> The Democratic Republic of Congo is blessed with 80 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves, 10 percent of its copper, 30 percent of its diamonds, and other diverse mining resources that contribute to 25 percent of GDP output and 75 percent of total exports, along

with rich renewable energy and agricultural sources. Yet Congo has not realized its development potential for many of the same reasons cited for other African states: "government corruption, mismanagement, and profligacy. . . . War only furthered the collapse."<sup>179</sup> South Africa is the continent's largest and most diverse source for important metallic and nonmetallic minerals. These raw materials account for nearly all of South Africa's primary exports, which at only 48 percent of all exports indicates a diversification of the economy that few other countries in Africa share. South Africa is a rare case where resources do not seem to hold back economic and human development because of the country's relatively better governance, economic management, greater stability, and diversification into higher order economic activities. Morocco, on the other hand, is not as well endowed with physical resources, although it is the world's leading exporter of phosphates used in fertilizer, which make up 92 percent of its mining earnings.<sup>180</sup> Together with some food products, primary commodities only make up 35 percent of Morocco's exports, but this contributes to a higher HDI of 0.646, ranking 126th – very close to South Africa's level.<sup>181</sup> Why is it that despite the abundant natural resources found in Africa, only 3 of Africa's 54 states (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tunisia) rank in the top 100 of the HDI,<sup>182</sup> and none maintain this ranking through agriculture or raw resources?

Despite its potential benefits, a case can be made that reliance on Africa's huge endowment of natural resources is actually a detriment to development because Africa's wealth is so mismanaged as to retard real growth elsewhere. Thomas Friedman, a noted modern economics author, calls this the "curse of oil," but the curse could be extended to reliance on any



natural resource sold as a state's primary means of revenue. Friedman explains:

As long as the monarchs and dictators who run these oil states can get rich by drilling their natural resources—as opposed to drilling the natural talents and energy of their people—they can stay in office forever. They can use oil money to monopolize all the instruments of power—army, police, and intelligence—and never have to introduce real transparency or power sharing. . . . Countries focused on tapping their people have to focus on developing real institutions, property rights, rule of law, independent courts, modern education, foreign trade, foreign investments, freedom of thought, and scientific enquiry to get the most out of their men and women.<sup>183</sup>

Friedman's comments describe a plutocracy that is common in Africa, a self-serving elite whose grip on power and wealth is simplified by the concentrated, in-place, self-contained nature of mineral extraction between a single foreign or local entity with capital and expertise and a willing government that advances the elites' financial interests, and keeps the country in a dependent relationship with international institutions.<sup>184</sup> An example is tolerating "piracy and bunkering, or the theft of oil out of pipelines, [which] are estimated to drain \$1 billion to \$4 billion annually from West African oil production. An estimated 25 percent of Cameroon's is stolen."<sup>185</sup> Worse is the *kleptocracy*, where elites steal outright national wealth. The books of Angola's state oil company, Sonangol, are treated as virtual state secrets. In 1998 more than a billion dollars was secured for exploration permits but "much of it disappeared off of the books."<sup>186</sup> Natural resource wealth has also literally fueled violent conflict that so readily plagues the continent.

The most notorious were *blood diamonds* smuggled out by warring factions and sold on the world market to finance war and insurgency. Africa's bloodiest civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo was funded through diamonds and its other resources.<sup>187</sup> The source of the natural wealth does not matter as much as how that wealth is applied to achieve development, or misapplied to prevent it. Unfortunately most resources are squandered through lack of judicious administration, meaning such natural wealth may be a detriment under the wrong circumstances.

For all of their promise, the limitations of natural resources in advancing development are widespread and multifaceted. Some limits are due to the inherent traits of natural resources, which concentrate their wealth in only a few fortunate economies, and whose price, and therefore aid to development, fluctuates with an international market. The outside assistance needed to generate supply and demand has opened resource extraction to past colonial and alleged neo-colonial relationships. Internal and external conflict may be exacerbated by fighting over control of natural resources, and ethnic divisions have also been factors in diminishing the returns. However, the most significant factor, and one over which Africans themselves hold the most control, is that of mal-governance and poor administration, which diverts the benefit of natural resource revenue from developing economic and human resources to ineffective schemes or outright corruption. The proper administration of Africa's natural resources for the betterment of society is often an unrealized dream. However, good administration can promote economic and human prosperity as states from Norway to Australia have demonstrated, and of which Botswana is the best African example.

The key to such success is the same as in successful resource-poor countries such as Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Finland, and Taiwan—good governance that invests in its people and a stable and secure foundation to build upon. That is why gauging social and economic measures is so important to understanding development. Good economic planning and the development of human capital are some of the best ways to invest in the future, by harnessing natural resources and talent and diversifying the economy into higher order activities.

### **Industry.**

If Africans wish to attain the same levels of economic, social, and demographic development as did Europe, North America, and Japan, they could follow a similar path to advancement from primary to secondary economic activities. These countries showed that the most important component of the economic development process is its people in terms of numbers, literacy, health, and productivity. The demographic characteristics of a country are a second major component of the economic development process, and one that is particularly suitable for aiding development and building secondary economic activities by some African countries. Secondary economic activities are manufacturing, construction, power production, and other activities “that process, transform, and assemble raw materials into useful products [or] take manufactured goods and fabricate them into finished consumer products.”<sup>188</sup> Industry depends on the productivity of people, which is the labor value-added to a product beyond the cost of raw material and energy inputs.<sup>189</sup> The productivity

of people depends on their literacy, skills, and health as enhanced by processes and capital inputs like tools, transportation, and communications. The dividends from value-added human intellect and fabrication using capital and technology have been earlier demonstrated in the higher returns from commercial agriculture over subsistence. People are key components of both farming and industry. However, with farming the population is relatively dispersed while in industry workers are usually concentrated in cities or their surroundings, which results in an economy of scale in production, concentration of support facilities like transportation and communication nodes, and more efficient consumption of products produced. Although the mining and drilling of resources are considered primary economic activities, extraction shares many characteristics with industry so they are sometimes analyzed together, as with the data used in Table 8. The similarities between extraction and manufacturing are that both operate from point locations, involve higher level worker skills and technology, require expensive capital infrastructure investments and access to power, and offer higher economic returns. Because of the economic advantages that secondary activities provide, "one of the markers of underdevelopment today is the relative absence of modern manufacturing capability."<sup>190</sup> In Sub-Saharan Africa, industry has fared poorly, declining in relative world share since 1975 from 4.8 percent to 2.4 percent in 1990.<sup>191</sup> In 2006, according to Director General Kandeh Yumkella of the UN Industrial Development Organization, Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world industrial output stands at 1 percent, and half of that comes from South Africa. In contrast, South Korea alone produces 3.4 percent of the world's industrial output.<sup>192</sup> Clearly, industry

has played a much smaller role in Africa's economies than agriculture or resource extraction. Industry has remained stagnant in absolute terms and declined in relative terms over the past decades. If African societies wish to develop further, then industrialization is one path to follow, as has already occurred in developed states.

All African states have some light manufacturing tailored to domestic markets, which may range from a village blacksmith to a small local bottling plant. It is at the intraregional and international levels that African manufacturing remains paltry and uncompetitive. However, Africans do possess some comparative advantages for their own development through industries in which native components are significant. Most major industrial areas in Africa are centered in urban areas near natural resources such as West Africa's petroleum fields, Southwest Africa's ring of diamonds, South Africa's mineral rich Witwatersrand, copper in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the agricultural regions of Lake Victoria and central Ethiopia.<sup>193</sup> Dependence on primary goods is common in the early stages of industrialization because it builds upon existing economic specialization. For example, Ethiopia's small industrial sector depends upon agriculture to produce textiles from its cotton crop, and leather goods from its cattle herds.<sup>194</sup> Such agriculturally-based manufacturing accounts for 66 percent of Ethiopia's manufacturing base, 73 percent in Uganda, and 90 percent in Burundi.<sup>195</sup> These efforts are only a small first step, however. Botswana, on the other hand, has been remarkably successful in using its main natural resource, diamonds, to attain one of the world's highest sustained economic growth rates. Stability, security, and good governance are major

contributors to this success, but they have also benefited from higher level activities, going beyond being the world's largest producer of crude diamonds.<sup>196</sup> To gain the economic benefits of value-added human fabrication, the government insisted that its partner, the giant diamond company DeBeers, move its sorting operations from London and its cutting, polishing, and marketing operations from India to Botswana.<sup>197</sup> This lucrative arrangement has maintained one of Africa's highest GDPs per capita – shared by a small population composed mostly of subsistence farmers.

South Africa, the continent's economic powerhouse, has an industrial base founded on natural resources and local requirements. However, a well-developed infrastructure in communications, transportation and energy, a strong business services sector, and relative stability have allowed diverse industries producing automobiles, metalwork, machinery, textiles, iron and steel, and chemicals to develop within South Africa.<sup>198</sup> Yet despite these advantages, South Africa's manufacturing remains as stagnant as that of the rest of Africa.<sup>199</sup> Mauritius' industry also started with a basic commodity, sugar, but the government aggressively diversified it to achieve a middle income economy. In the 1960s, raw sugar accounted for 86 percent of export earnings because it is the island's only viable commercial crop. Since then, Mauritius has expanded to processing molasses, and more recently to producing bio-fuel from sugar waste to generate 60 percent of the country's electricity. Mauritius has purposely grown beyond its natural resources to enter into the labor intensive textile industry as a way to continue to advance its economy further. At its peak in 2004, such light manufacturing accounted for 21.4 percent of GDP, almost all for export.<sup>200</sup> To become

internationally competitive, the government of Mauritius heavily invested in its human potential and physical infrastructure, and is showing the benefits in its favorable development measurements, including an equitable income distribution.<sup>201</sup> Industry based on using native natural resources is a basic stepping stone towards development, but because Mauritius is resource poor, it has purposefully enabled and harnessed its human resources. Nearly all countries in Africa have started down the industrialization path, except for South Africa and Mauritius, few have gone far. The fundamentals of stability, good government planning, and proper investment once again demonstrate their value for economic and social development. However, even with the achievement of some successes, Africa's most advanced countries face problems in sustaining their development and maintaining their relatively high standards of living.

Despite the previous examples, Africa cannot be construed as an industrialized region. Even with a few bright examples, African economies must surmount daunting intrastate and interstate obstacles to grow their industrial bases so as to become competitive. Continuing to examine Mauritius' manufacturing illustrates some of the problems that African states face. The industrial gains made by Mauritius through the harnessing of its one agricultural asset, sugar, and the textile skills of its people were challenged by changes to international trade policy. In 2005, the EU started to remove preferential trade agreements in sugar given to former colonial states (Mauritius was a British possession until 1968). This has severely strained sugar farming and its attendant industries, the island's most important employer and revenue source. To remain competitive, seven of eleven sugar processing plants

Country	Employment In industry (% employ)	GDP from Industry (% of total)	Industrial Exports	Employment in Services (% employ)	GDP from Services (% of total)	Intrnat'l Tourists (000s)
Algeria	23	61	Petroleum products	63	30	866
Botswana	n/a	51	Textiles	n/a	47	843
Chad	8 (approx)	47	None	12 (approx)	31	44
Congo, Rep	n/a	57	Plywood	n/a	37	26
Ethiopia	8	13	Leather products	12	38	125
Ghana	15	25	Aluminum	29	38	373
Kenya	10 (approx)	17	Petroleum products	15 (approx)	59	990
Mauritius	30	25	Clothing, molasses	61	70	n/a
Nigeria	10	53	Petroleum products	20	29	813
Sierra Leone n/a	31	None	n/a	20	10	
South Africa	26	27	Machinery	65	71	6,026
Sudan	7	36	Petroleum products	13	33	39
UK	18	24		81	75	4900
USA	23	21		76	78	52,690
Notes: Data from 2007. Tourism data from 2000, except Botswana and South Africa from 1999. Employment in Industry and GDP from Industry percentage includes mining and drilling.						
Sources: CIA's <i>2008 World Factbook</i> , 2007 data. Tourism: Tom Nevin, "African Tourism Review," African Business, February 2003, except U.S. and UK from World Tourism Organization Release "Millennium Tourism Boom in 2000."						

**Table 8. Comparison of Industry and Services  
Employment and Production Indicators.**



closed, farming practices were modernized, and alternate derivative products were developed. These were strong government responses to adverse circumstances. A second blow also ended favorable U.S. and European textile import quotas, which had successfully stimulated industry in the world's poorest countries. These changes closed hundreds of factories in Mauritius, which at the time was the world's second largest exporter of woolen knits.<sup>202</sup> Lesotho's burgeoning textile industry suffered the same fate in 2005. Under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), passed in 2000, African development was promoted through increased trade and investment.<sup>203</sup> East Asian manufacturers took advantage of cheap African labor and reduced U.S. duties to invest U.S. \$100 million in Lesotho, employing 50,000 people and producing 10.5 percent of its GDP. The end of preferential imports brought the near overnight collapse of this industry in Lesotho and other African countries.<sup>204</sup> There are international trade obstacles preventing development other than trade barriers. For example, Africa's young industries lack the fundamentals to gain entry into developed markets; the same quality, safety, marketing, and other problems that African agricultural produce also faces. International standards are higher and more ubiquitous than in decades past, and integrating into multilateral trading systems like the World Trade Organization (WTO) is more difficult.<sup>205</sup> Thus African industry needs to improve its production capacity, but its efforts are undercut by an inability to attract foreign capital and expertise, and by international trade regulations.

In many cases Africans and their governments have also undermined their own industrial development. Zimbabwe once boasted one of Africa's more diverse

economies and modern industrial sectors. It successfully exported textiles, footwear, and agricultural machinery to regional markets. However, inept management, corruption, and a draconian one-party state polarized society and eviscerated an industrial success story.<sup>206</sup> Violence and instability are perhaps the biggest causes of underdevelopment in Africa because it frightens away capital investment and investors who seek stability to reap a return. Even after investments are made, stability is needed to operate, as the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates with its long-running internal conflict contributing to an industrial capacity producing at just 25 percent and unemployment at 85 percent in 2005.<sup>207</sup> Lack of infrastructure investment is another chronic problem for industrialization. A U.S. \$1.2 billion mega aluminum smelter was located in Mozambique to take advantage of cheap hydro-electric potential from the Zambezi River. However, the finished plant will consume four times Mozambique's average electricity production and requires major investment in additional dams and in Mozambique's fledgling natural gas industry for more energy. The project is stalled after its first phase until more power is generated. However, needed investment is arriving from foreign investors impressed with the government's open economic regime and capitalist development, which has made Mozambique one of the most dynamic economies in Africa.<sup>208</sup> Mozambique is benefiting from its government's policies, but many states do not, and poor governance and administration may be the second biggest cause for lack of development. A disappointing example is Ethiopia where private land ownership is illegal, hampering investment in industry such that only a small portion of Ethiopia's economic production is manufactured.<sup>209</sup> Governments such as the ones in

Nigeria or Cameroon also misallocate public funds, undercutting important sectors like agriculture by investing in the more glamorous extraction industry.<sup>210</sup> Sometimes these misallocations “stimulated rural-urban migration, yet there were insufficient jobs to absorb those who left the countryside,” and the misallocation was also a cause for food shortages on the continent.<sup>211</sup> Government imposed import substitution strategies strive to build young native industries by protecting them in their local market from foreign competition. Inevitably, though, such policies produce inefficient low quality companies, whose products are globally uncompetitive and too expensive for local consumers. African government efforts are better spent making their industries competitive through establishing “institutions for industrial standards, testing, expert support, quality assurance, training, technology information, research, and technical extension and assistance for investors, suppliers, subcontractors, and local African entrepreneurs.”<sup>212</sup> Neo-liberal trade policies, such as the “Washington Consensus,” advocate an export-led development strategy that would open up African economies to world trade starting with African agricultural and extractive products. This might reverse Africa’s declining share of world trade, which now stands at only 1.5 percent.<sup>213</sup> In 2001, *Afrobarometer* cited several African countries for their positive market reforms and democratization including Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.<sup>214</sup> If their efforts continue, these are the countries that have positioned themselves for success through their internal efforts, adapting to international markets and using international support to lead African economies past old negative tendencies and toward sustainable development.

## Services.

A third part of an economy is its tertiary economic activities, its services. These complement and enhance the primary and secondary activities and add vigor to an economy through diversity and greater depth. Services are any activity that fulfills a human want or need and returns money to those who provide it. There are three types of services with numerous subtypes that include consumer services such as retail and wholesale, education, health, leisure and hospitality; business services such as financial, professional, transportation, and communications; and public services like security and social services.<sup>215</sup>

As with primary and secondary economic activities, tertiary activities rely on the economic development components of people, the natural environment, and societal culture. Whereas the success of primary activities was particularly sensitive to the natural environment, and secondary activities to the quality of a population, tertiary activities are especially dependent on culture. Culture is the way that a society “organizes itself in terms of beliefs, values, customs and lifestyles [which] greatly influences both the direction and degree of development.”<sup>216</sup> When service activities are used to generate international revenue, the manner in which a culture embraces change and globalization is a key to success. Like industry, the added-value of people’s involvement and investment required for many tertiary activities give these higher order economic endeavors greater returns.

The human-to-human aspect of services that provide international revenue puts a premium on the culture component of development in order to sufficiently

interact with other societies and embrace the constant fast-paced changes that globalization requires. Some examples of cultural characteristics are typical personal-societal obligation traits that could impact the success of international services through the concept of time (Western economies are monochronic, being more schedule driven than polychronic societies, as typically found in Africa), attitude towards uncertainty (Western economies are more accepting of uncertainty and risk than uncertainty avoidance cultures), and acceptance of authority (participation in Western economies is more flat and distributed than in high power distance cultures).<sup>217</sup>

The service sector of most African economies is composed primarily of internal personal services ranging from retail vendors to primary schools to cell phone providers. At some level, services have existed throughout Africa's history alongside agriculture and basic industries. African tertiary activities can include high technology and support other parts of the economy at the same time. One prime example is the research conducted by African universities to find better adapted crops and techniques to spur subsistence and commercial agriculture. Other examples of service support to African activities include banking and insurance to cover factories and mines and public transportation and security to help bring crops to market. Although all African countries have some services, the strongest and largest economies have broadened themselves to offer international services. Among several such African activities, tourism and intraregional business services are two of the more important that will be presented here as examples. Even though they constitute only a small part of the overall economy, expanding global tertiary activities

should be a goal for Africans, since these activities tend to use higher order human skills, are more lucrative, and are a catalyst to higher economic and human development. They have also been the best method of development for countries like Singapore, which are resource poor but invest heavily in the skills and well-being of their people.

One natural resource for which Africa is renowned but is not mined or drilled is its inspiring landscape and abundant wildlife, from the tropical rain forests to the vast grass savannas. In 2001 28.4 million international tourists visited these sights, generating U.S. \$11.7 billion in much needed foreign income for Africa. Many countries see tourism as vital in generating revenue for economic development. Tourism can be a boon to job creation, attract foreign expertise to develop local skills, balance intrastate development, and diversify an economy. Since Africa is the destination of choice for only 4.1 percent of international tourists worldwide, there is much growth potential in this sector.<sup>218</sup> One Zambian businessman summed up the promise and challenges of tourism when he said, "Virtually Africa-wide, the tourism industry has been identified as the sector most likely to build national economies. The painful question is how to stimulate the political will, persuade governments and private sectors to fund tourism infrastructure . . . and, probably most importantly, for governments to inspire the confidence of foreign investors."<sup>219</sup> Some African countries have answered these questions and succeeded in attracting tourists, especially Kenya in the east; Mauritius and the Seychelles on the Indian Ocean; Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt in the north; Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal in the west; and South Africa. Some of this success is a result of scenic natural resources and climate — advantageous

but not equitably distributed elements of tourism. Another geographic advantage is close proximity to Europe, which helped North Africa attract over a third of Africa's tourists (10.6 million) and receipts (U.S. \$4.2 billion) in 2001.<sup>220</sup> A third important factor is stability and security. Quite simply, tourists are attracted to safe and secure areas for vacation, and investors look for macroeconomic stability to realize a return in infrastructure investments like lodging, transportation, and attractions. Zimbabwe is a case in point. It slipped from 1.2 million visitors in 1999 to a few thousand in 2002 because of the political and economic problems that threaten violence in that country. The expectation of stability in the rest of southern Africa plays an important part in the World Tourism Organization predictions that this region will become Africa's top tourist destination by 2020 with 36 million visitors, nearly quadruple the number it had in 2000.<sup>221</sup> Tourism also tends to succeed in countries where other foreign enterprises already exist with functioning investment ties, open channels of communication, and good understanding of foreign cultures<sup>222</sup> — meaning established integration into the international community, or continuing dependence through neo-colonialism, depending on one's perspective. Kenya is an example of these conditions where "pioneer facilities development was in place because Kenya had a vigorous expatriate community which sought to advance foreign commercial interests, including tourism." Not coincidentally, East Africa was the third most visited African region with 5.9 million visitors in 2001, and expected to grow proportionately through 2020.<sup>223</sup> By establishing good economic fundamentals of a stable environment and global connections, Africa's tourism can greatly boost the continent's development aspirations.

As with other endeavors, good governance and political will are also required to attain the stability and globalization needed to thrive in international tourism, but also to support human development in terms of health and education, legal rights for private enterprise and political freedoms, and the construction and maintenance of a basic physical infrastructure. Such good governance also enhances other economic endeavors but is particularly important to activities like tourism that have a strong international component. The Seychelles is a model for applying these criteria towards tourism, having hosted 140,000 elite tourists in 2006 accounting for 70 percent of its foreign earnings and an impressive GDP per capita. Most African countries have been unable to establish such criteria and, as a consequence, have not built higher end activities like tourism. Establishing tourism in an environmentally sustainable way is another form of good governance and critically important to maintain the assets that tourists seek.<sup>224</sup> Sustainability is also attained through building native human resources to develop quality services and to encourage skills that could improve other economic sectors as well.<sup>225</sup> Even if all of these conditions are properly set, unexpected events such as terrorism may undercut any efforts, which is why diversity of activities in an economy is important. For example, Morocco registered decreases in its important tourism businesses after the attacks of September 2001, and even more after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.<sup>226</sup> In Tanzania, tourism has dropped significantly following the al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. embassy in 1998 and with the subsequent rise in Islamist moralism.<sup>227</sup> Although often seen as a main engine for development in Africa, the broad requirements for natural or cultural attractions—human development



skills, cultural sensibilities and globalization, stability, and good governance—have set a high bar for entry into tourist services. Much like mineral extraction and manufacturing, tourism can also disturb fragile balances in local societies, infrastructure, and the environment. However, those countries that succeed in tourism experience a synergistic effect that improves other economic sectors. For these reasons, rather than being the engine of African-wide development, tourism may reinforce the gulf between developing and poor countries<sup>228</sup> and for most countries may simply be a mark of development rather than a way to reach it.

Often, countries that are sophisticated enough to establish a tertiary sector like international tourism also possess the skills and resources to diversify into other higher service activities as well. Higher level services include the banking, insurance, brokering, and other services commonly grouped under the financial sector of business services. A strong financial services sector is particularly prized in an economy because it is not only a lucrative sector in its own right, but one that can financially support and boost other economic activities from agriculture to services. In the weak financial markets often found in Africa, a strong indigenous financial sector can fill a void to become a regional hub gaining foreign revenue and attracting international expertise for local companies and their workers. However, doing so usually requires liberalizing the local economy and removing barriers. Although it is considered risky to open an economy to global competition, the advantages are a larger potential market and the effort of compelling native businesses to sharpen their skills, broaden services and products, and lower costs to other businesses. Becoming a competitive regional financial hub also

requires sophisticated communications, transportation, research, and managerial skills and infrastructure bolstering those and other sectors as well.<sup>229</sup> Mauritius has deliberately expanded its economy beyond sugar, textiles, and tourism to embrace banking, communications, and information technology by creating cyber cities, and tapping into the fiber-optic cable that runs from Europe to India's "high-tech" corridor.<sup>230</sup> In so doing, it has become a regional financial hub, luring over 32,000 off-shore entities worth U.S. \$1 billion to transact business in India, China, and Africa.<sup>231</sup> Mauritius also benefits from its predominately Indian culture to serve as go-between for businesses in India and the rest of the world. To bridge the shortage in needed skilled workers, Mauritius has invested heavily in education, extended the school day, and added technological subjects to its curriculum, but a lack of qualified people remains its biggest impediment to growth.<sup>232</sup> South Africa has built a well-regulated and sophisticated financial sector that attracts many foreign financial businesses to the region because its technology, infrastructure, and supervision meet competitive world standards.<sup>233</sup> Because of these standards, South Africa's stock exchange has grown to become the 17th largest in the world and now includes many foreign brokerages that control up to 40 percent of the market; yet the bourse's overall size grew so much that few of the local traders lost revenue.<sup>234</sup> South Africa is the continent's leader in commercial loans, financial advisory services, foreign exchange, securities trading, and insurance; all of which make South Africa an important launching point into Africa for international business.<sup>235</sup> In 2003, South Africa also had 38,000 people working in call centers, taking advantage of its communications infrastructure and human skills.

Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar have also started international call center operations, but have only 16,000 jobs among them.<sup>236</sup> Striving to become a services' hub requires liberalizing economic policies and investing in requisite infrastructure and people skills in order to take advantage of regional financial services.

Not all international financial dealings are by large transnational corporations. Because of Africa's maldistribution of resources, wealth, and opportunities, many workers are migrant, sending remittances to their families at home. Lesotho, for instance, has few resources, so many of its 50 percent unemployed go to South Africa to work. Although declining, in 1996 remittances still accounted for a third of the entire GDP of Lesotho.<sup>237</sup> Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and overseas countries like Spain, Great Britain, and France host many African workers who need to send money home. Kenya is the regional hub in East Africa for financial services, dealing in both large commercial and small micro-fund transfers.<sup>238</sup> Kenya's claim as the regional hub comes from its relative strength in regulation and better coverage in terms of numbers of banks and population served—even though its financial services do not reach global standards.<sup>239</sup> The small and informal nature of such exchanges makes tracking them difficult, but they remain major sources of income and part of Kenya's strength as a financial hub. As desirable as financial and other services may be as part of an economy, the high cost of capital to develop the infrastructure and human skills needed to participate has severely limited or barred most African states from benefiting.<sup>240</sup> An ironic twist for African states is that international banking is mature enough to be used in a reverse transfer of wealth because African

states must repay huge debts they incurred—U.S. \$15 billion for interest alone in 2003.<sup>241</sup> International debt relief as pioneered by the British government at the G8 Gleneagles conference in 2005 has started a welcome trend of debt reduction for 38 countries, most of them African, based on demonstrated improved governance.<sup>242</sup> These actions should help right financial systems, lower balance of payments, and divert debt payments into a states' physical and human capital. Debt relief and the reward of good governance are welcome steps in reinforcing basic requirements for development: stability, government transparency, liberalizing economies, and investment in human and physical capital. In banking, as in most of the other international services, Africans are woefully deficient—both a cause and an indicator of their underdeveloped status.

### **Africa's Economy Summary.**

Although often described and perceived as a single entity, Africa's people and economies are no monolith. Africa presents a complex environment with many factors affecting its diverse parts. Africa boasts some success stories, along with the world's most destitute people and conditions. Almost half of Sub-Saharan African states averaged an economic growth rate of 5 percent or more in 2003, and over a third in 2006, with 16 countries sustaining growth of over 4 percent for a decade. Although Sub-Saharan economies have grown by over 4.5 percent from 2000 to 2007, the growth rate did not keep pace with the higher average of other underdeveloped countries, but did beat the world average and, most important for real gains, exceeded the population growth rate.<sup>243</sup> Despite recent relative

success, Africa's 54 states still occupy 26 of the world's bottom 32 rankings in GDP-PPP per capita (with Malawi at the bottom), 28 of the lowest 36 in literacy rates (with Burkina Faso the lowest), 35 of the lowest 37 states in life expectancy (Zambia being the worst), and 34 of the last 40 counties in the HDI (with Sierra Leone bringing up the rear, but Liberia and Somalia did not report and may be in worse shape).<sup>244</sup> What caused these differences? The problems bringing about such poverty are many, as discussed in the preceding sections. Economic reasons include low human labor value added in most African activities, low or fluctuating commodity prices, lack of investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, over-reliance on one primary economic product for foreign revenue, difficulty in meeting world standards in products and globalization requirements, dependence on one or a few international markets in which to sell goods, state domination of the economy, poor corporate administration and oversight, and import price shocks. Political problems include lack of stability or violence through frequent coups, civil wars and cross-border fighting, dominance of self-serving elites, inadequate citizen representation, and poor or counterproductive government policies. These factors undermine the security and stability that African states require if they are to continue to develop economically and mature politically. These are the goals for which Africans, and those external bodies like USAFRICOM that intend to meaningfully help Africans, must strive to achieve if real and enduring progress is to be made towards peace, security, and stability in Africa.

## ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The situation in Africa is bleak and has been for decades. Other developing regions have far surpassed it in social, economic, and political measurements of development and governance, which remain stubbornly stalled in Africa. Africans, as well as the rest of the world community, need peace and prosperity on the continent to benefit its people, attain mutual security and humanitarian aspirations, and incorporate Africa into the world's economy. Foreign assistance, including military support like that represented by USAFRICOM, can be of great help toward the achievement of these goals. Such support can assist with much needed security and stability by performing an external security role, and to a lesser extent, in establishing and maintaining internal law, order, and justice. These are traditional missions of military peace operations that are well understood and are internationally sanctioned. The military's role in the equally important requirements for economic development and better governance has precedents from humanitarian relief to security assistance and stability operations. However, the involvement of a military force in these endeavors may be more controversial, misunderstood, or misapplied. The previous discussion of how Africa's importance warrants international assistance, the precedent for military involvement in establishing security and stability, and the need to address economic development and political governance were presented as background information in order to better examine possible foreign government actions to improve the conditions in Africa. This next section elaborates on a continuum of actions to better organize and administer assistance in order to illuminate what

has been accomplished in terms of the status quo and what improvement can be made to current models. The upcoming section also discusses what could be done with greater direct military involvement and leadership, or with military support given under the close direction of other government agencies. This discussion will enable the reader to decide how foreign government assistance can be used to help Africans achieve peace and prosperity.

The past use of aid has proven that external help alone will not solve Africa's problems. Africans need to fix their own problems. However, these problems are of such magnitude that leaving them strictly for Africans to solve will take a very long time to succeed. Outside help is still needed, but not of the type given in the past. Since independence, African states have absorbed a net total of \$600 billion in foreign aid with disappointing results—confirming that the current efforts by Africans and the international community to improve the situation are insufficient.<sup>245</sup> During the Cold War, foreign aid was often misdirected simply to win political support.<sup>246</sup> Such engagement was the antithesis of good governance or proper economic development and as a result, many Africans “lost faith in the various projects of modernization and development that promised Africans a better life,” with ramifications still echoing today.<sup>247</sup> Corruption, instability, and underdeveloped infrastructure and human resources have discouraged most international business investment, leaving 70 percent of gross capital formation in Africa stemming from donor country hand-outs and less than 15 percent from foreign investment. The little foreign business investment available is usually cordoned in enclaves of natural resources that are buffered from local economies to

limit exposure to crime and conflict.<sup>248</sup> Africans have grown reliant on outside aid rather than solving their own problems, and may now be trapped in the paradox of needing aid to grow more self-reliant. However it is delivered, aid to Africans should be given so as to build African economic and governing capacity while reducing their need for such aid, the dependency on which has historically slowed African progress.

### **Keep What Works.**

Security trumps everything. It does little good to build a school if parents are afraid to send their children to that school because they may not come home.

James Stephenson  
in *Losing the Golden Hour*<sup>249</sup>

Security and stability are prerequisites for any improvements in Africa, so attaining them should be the first step for indigenous and international policymakers and planners. This is also certainly the desire of the local populace for whom relative safety in conducting daily affairs is of great concern.<sup>250</sup> The creation of a benign environment also benefits the population through the safe introduction of the services of crucial civilian government agencies and inter-government and nongovernment organizations, and the more effective use of available military support.<sup>251</sup> Such was the case by 1952 in occupied Japan where “without a secure environment in which to operate, the likelihood of SCAP [Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers] successfully guiding the Japanese Government to political and economic reform was slim at best.”<sup>252</sup> Where conditions have deteriorated beyond the ability of local government, law enforcement,



and military forces to provide a stable and secure environment, foreign military forces could employ their inherent capabilities to restore these necessary conditions.<sup>253</sup> The type of military actions needed to do so depends on the nature of the threats faced and how advanced the stability and security efforts are. Sometimes coercive military actions are needed to counter political and criminal threats and violence, as international forces tried to do in Somalia in the 1990s. Under other circumstances, a military force may act simply as a deterrent and require no direct intervention at all.<sup>254</sup> Between these two, FM 3-07 suggests that military forces can transform conflict, “the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations,” and address the causes of strife.<sup>255</sup> Although a less traditional form of military intervention, conflict transformation could convert disruptive actions into economic and political improvements. Thomas Barnett also believes that economic and political progress depend upon the elimination of conflict and that military forces are an important way to achieve peace. In this vein, he asserts that security is the “most influential [U.S.] public-sector export.”<sup>256</sup> On a national interest level, a U.S. security umbrella over Africa also protects U.S. investments and resources and opens Africa to benefit from international investment, expertise, and trade.<sup>257</sup> According to FM 3-07, attaining security and stability are part of the primary stability tasks assigned to U.S. military forces when, under some circumstances, military forces must be part of the solution overseas.

Conflict resolution through hard power may be what most military forces train for and do best, but

they may also deliver security and stability through less lethal soft power methods, such as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) concept of peacetime military engagement. Such engagement comes from USAFRICOM and other U.S. combatant command theater security cooperation programs, “which share many of the same broad goals as stability operations . . . to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, [and] foster economic growth. . . .”<sup>258</sup> Security engagement recognizes that security and stability are vital to both U.S. and host country interests, but should be attained through cooperative improvement to local conditions with U.S. forces rather than more drastic direct intervention. This is what USAFRICOM’s commander calls “active security—defined as a persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to foster dialogue and development.”<sup>259</sup> Here the AFRICOM Commander refers to security assistance: the best known of many types of security cooperation, which supplies defense-related articles, training, and services to another country.<sup>260</sup> However, security assistance is only one of many defense programs supplied by the U.S. military through U.S. ambassadors to shore up similar values and interests between the United States and host countries while achieving common goals.<sup>261</sup> FM 3-07 also notes that “the most effective measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development . . . [and] Stability tasks executed as part of a theater security cooperation plan under the operational theme of peacetime military engagement generally fall in this category.”<sup>262</sup> Peacetime military engagement consists of many programs to deliver these results. The following paragraphs give three examples

of such assistance to put into context how they are used in Africa: professionalization activities like combined education, training, and exercises; humanitarian assistance; and broader nation assistance activities. Security engagement is an important contribution to the security and stability of far more countries than that of direct hard power, and will remain a part of any potential solutions that military forces are called upon to support.

Since combined education, training, and exercises are highly visible and well established within the U.S. military, they should constitute part of any solution involving government-to-government assistance. An example in education is USAFRICOM's African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) which offers informative seminars to senior military and civilian African leaders to provide institutional and individual understanding about military forces operating under democratic institutions. The British, French, and other governments run similar educational partnerships to build a military capability for professional, competent African leaders.<sup>263</sup> At lower leadership levels, from 2002 to 2005 U.S. military programs provided training to approximately 2,000 Africans annually in a variety of undertakings covering 47 African countries at a cost of U.S. \$250.6 million.<sup>264</sup> Examples of bilateral activities include U.S. marines training Algerians on patrolling techniques;<sup>265</sup> U.S. airmen in Botswana teaching airlift, security, and logistics;<sup>266</sup> and \$500 million for internal security training through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative to increase border security and counterterrorism capability.<sup>267</sup> Because of their bilateral worth, other developed countries also offer such programs, such as the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) and French *Renforcement*

*des Capacités Africaines de Maintien la Paix* (RECOMP), each also emphasizing the “train-the-trainer” concept and sustained engagement.<sup>268</sup> Such professionalization of national forces in Africa counters the *coup d’etat* and factional fighting by armed forces that have been major sources of instability in African states.

One particularly successful U.S. training program that instills discipline and basic military skills in African forces, while also directly contributing to continent-wide peace and stability, is the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). Initially conceived as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) after the Somalia and Rwanda debacles, ACOTA seeks to strengthen African peacekeeping and humanitarian response capabilities while resolving Africa’s problems internally.<sup>269</sup> This arrangement has reduced direct U.S. participation in African peacekeeping operations (PKO) by replacing it with improved African peacekeeping forces. Since ACRI’s inception in 1997, the program has trained 45,000 African troops and 3,200 trainers from 21 participating countries at a rate of 21 battalions a year,<sup>270</sup> with four of the 10 top UN contributing countries in 2006 coming from Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Kenya).<sup>271</sup> This leaves the U.S. military to directly support African PKO with specialized services in short supply, like logistics, airlift, communications, and fire support.<sup>272</sup> For example, in 2009 USAFRICOM began large scale support to peace operations for African troops in Darfur by airlifting Rwandan troops and equipment.<sup>273</sup> The immediate benefit of ACOTA is to apply an African solution to African problems. Of more long-term importance is that peacekeeping missions “provide the lion’s share of operational experience for a growing proportion of African professional military

leaders at every level . . . shifting their operational context from post-colonial regime maintenance, traditional war fighting, and the struggle for black majority rule, to peace operations."<sup>274</sup> ACOTA offers an example of building military capacity in African states; partnership with outside powers to meet mutual needs and to attain international standards in operations; and perseverance to institutionalize this program and its values—which are also hallmarks of other U.S. and foreign education, training, and exercise plans. Such programs develop African military forces to contribute more to internal security and stability on the continent and instill a sense of transparent responsibility and respect for civil authorities, rule of law, and international human rights—“part of broader trends toward more representative and more accountable governance in Africa.”<sup>275</sup> Roles in soft power represented by education, training, and exercises are traditional military missions supporting other forces, and directly strengthen the stability and security for which military forces should exist.

Education, training, and exercises, however, do not adequately confront the underlying problems of economic development and good governance, although both stability operations and theater security engagement give U.S. military forces a role in addressing both. Other forms of military activities are closer to the mark of addressing humanitarian problems including Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). This assistance benefits the local populace as secondary activities of planned military operations or exercises. HCA serves to address basic human needs like medical, dental, or veterinary care; drilling wells or constructing sanitation facilities; and constructing or repairing roads and public facilities like schools and

clinics<sup>276</sup> for the society within which U.S. forces are operating. During a training exercise in Ghana and Togo for example, U.S. sailors treated thousands of local people with critically needed medical care. Another U.S. Navy example involved a construction battalion (Seabees) deployed to Liberia in 2008 that renovated two medical clinics and a large high school with electricity, running water, and structural improvements.<sup>277</sup> Such actions benefit the population with services they otherwise would not have received, improve the operational readiness of the military participants, and the U.S. Government members garner improved contacts, cultural understanding, and good will.<sup>278</sup> A similar program run by UN forces also strives to have a good effect while supporting other operational goals. A Quick Impact Project (QIP) is meant to assist a local population in a number of ways during a peacekeeping mission to include infrastructure improvement and income generating activities.<sup>279</sup> International programs like HCA and QIP help the impoverished with basic medical care, infrastructure improvement, and economic support in which Africa is woefully deficient, but they do not significantly contribute to systemic economic development on the level that African states need. Although such humanitarian programs are usually conducted in partnership with Africans, their immediate nature usually means that they are done for Africans by outsiders and therefore do not build crucial capacity whereby Africans learn to help themselves. These programs also lack persistence, often meeting an urgent need, but in a piecemeal way. For this reason, the UN warns that QIPs “are not a substitute for humanitarian and/or development assistance,” since their real purpose is to build respect for the UN mission and confidence in the peace process.<sup>280</sup> For

the United States, HCA benefits are acknowledged as residual, with their primary purpose being to influence and gain access for U.S. personnel. Only two of five HCA program objectives directly support local interests.<sup>281</sup> USAFRICOM's budget for HCA activity is very small and constrained, severely limiting its impact on development.<sup>282</sup> The tie between HCA and development problems in Africa is obvious, and HCA is one way to improve distressing situations. However, such programs' transitory and by-product nature lack perseverance and in-depth capacity building and are akin to previous less-effective methods that do not systemically address the root cause of problems in Africa. Although accomplishing some good locally while meeting foreign interests, such programs fall short in terms of the economic development and good governance that Africans need.

Although each part of theater security engagement may contribute in part or indirectly to economic development or good governance, nation assistance operations can allow military forces to address economic development and governance issues more broadly. In peacetime through war, nation assistance supports another country with "sustainable development and growth . . . to promote long term regional stability" under the direction of the Department of State. Nation assistance is an over arching category of U.S. theater security engagement that includes subcategories like HCA and security assistance,<sup>283</sup> but puts emphasis on long-term development, which is not an explicit characteristic of other activities.<sup>284</sup> In its widest application, nation assistance covers projects that its individual subcategories may not. Nation assistance operations may be conducted independent of other operations or exercises, or in conjunction

with other U.S. Government agencies, international government organizations (IGOs), NGOs, and host nation authorities.<sup>285</sup> These activities carry more gravity and significance in economic development and governance and may be akin to the stability operations projects conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the very beneficial nature of nation assistance in facilitating long-term security and stability, the U.S. military has often shied away from such missions, except when absolutely necessary. Reluctance to accept this mission stems from its potential to drain resources from combat duties, its long-term nature, and the reduction in military readiness caused by concentrating on secondary skills to the detriment of primary skills training. To date, U.S.-led nation assistance is rare in Africa, but a hypothetical mission using USAF Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (REDHORSE) illustrates the concept:

In remote areas of the world, particularly Africa, air transport may be the only means of contact to the outside world. . . . [REDHORSE] could be airlifted into these locations and begin providing support by rebuilding or constructing airfields to permit an open air supply route to that particular location. These airstrips, in turn, would act as conduits for supplying the region with food and healthcare. Construction units could also serve dual purposes in meeting economic and health interests by using their capability to drill water wells and erect needed facilities. . . . Additionally, these units could repair existing facilities to allow electricity, water, and other needed life support systems to become functional or construct earthen dams or the like to protect against natural disaster and meet environmental security needs.<sup>286</sup>

Through its use elsewhere in the world, the U.S. military has honed over time a nation assistance tradition that could serve African security and stability well.



On the political side of nation assistance, military forces may do more than help educate and train a professional military, they can actually build an improved organization. Security sector reform (SSR) can improve detrimental organizations by “organizing new institutions and units from the ministerial level to the smallest maneuver unit. Building infrastructure capability—such as personnel, logistics, and intelligence—is necessary for sustaining the new host-nation capacity.”<sup>287</sup> An example of this approach is how the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have coordinated to reestablish professional and accountable ministries of defense and armed forces respectively in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire following devastating and interlocking civil wars in western Africa. The U.S. Government’s nation assistance to Liberia included funding and running a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for former military and militia members, recruiting and vetting new recruits and civil staff, and training and equipping a right-sized force inculcated with professional skills, proper understanding of civil-military relations, and respect for law and rights. The new Liberian Ministry of National Defense (MND) civilians completed this process, too. Its staff learned topics from coordination skills to ethics, military justice, protocol, logistics, finance, planning, and public affairs to help them forge an effective bureaucracy. With proper education, pay, equipment, facilities, and procedures, all instituted through mutual consultation between the United States and Liberian governments, the new MND became a model for other Liberian ministries. Nation assistance in its grandest scale approaches the types and levels of economic and governance assistance needed for security and stability

in African countries and is the closest that U.S. military forces may come under current practices to realize African needs. However, current practices are such that significant nation assistance projects rarely occur except as a byproduct of combat with U.S. forces.

Even though military theater engagement has proven to be useful as a stand-alone program or as part of larger interagency efforts it does have room for improvement, and there are definite limits to what it can accomplish. Assuming that improved security and stability in Africa are priorities for theater engagement projects, one low cost improvement effort can be achieved by better cooperation among North American, European, and other donors to reduce administration and overhead costs.<sup>288</sup> Additionally, the program's impact could be enhanced by broadening the capacity of African nationals through larger coordinated programs and by increasing the duration of these programs enabling longer lasting effects. The SSR example given for Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire is an example of this approach that simultaneously leverages U.S., French, and British efforts to stop the violence that occurred among these countries. The Scandinavian countries combine efforts that share resources and programs to the point that individual country efforts are sometimes indistinguishable from the larger "Norden" group identity.<sup>289</sup> Working together with other countries may also reduce the crosscutting competition between donors that was frequent during the Cold War and that can undermine common goals.<sup>290</sup> This multinational approach takes more effort and reduces the recognition received by the donor, but its heightened impact on improving degraded conditions in Africa makes it worth the effort. Another improvement to theater

engagement, especially from the receivers' perspective, is to support regional cooperation initiatives, such as the African Standby Force, the African Union's standing force for Africans to respond to African crises and catastrophes.<sup>291</sup> In ACOTA, this approach is used with sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to consult and participate in peacekeeping, thereby reinforcing the inherent multinational nature of these operations.<sup>292</sup> Another example is the sub-regional MEDFLAG operations, which provide medical and humanitarian aid from the U.S., European, and Asian participants to multiple African countries.<sup>293</sup> For small African countries, dealing with major international donors through a regional organization is less overwhelming, and for regional powers such as Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, or Ethiopia it allows them to maintain their influence and feel less threatened by activities from foreigners.<sup>294</sup> Regional initiatives also better harness foreign-local collaboration because more expertise and resources remain on the African side, which builds more capacity and persistence since neighboring countries can reinforce and aid each other better after donor support is gone. Within internal donor country politics, regional initiatives also reduce the undue influence of country advocates with particular clout, which should make programs more efficient and persistent.<sup>295</sup> Even with improvements in donor cooperation and acting with regional organizations to enhance the effects of military engagement, inherent limits remain in how security cooperation programs can support underlying African security factors.

The many varieties of military engagement in Africa usually meet the foreign sponsors' interests through acquainting military leaders with potential partners,

providing familiarization with a region, establishing access to areas, and serving as “good insurance that the United States will have militarily competent, dependable regional allies in crisis,”<sup>296</sup> which is why these programs continue even through lean donor government budgets. In professionalizing local armed forces and making them better contributors to stability, theater engagement activities are generally useful to host nations through the education, training, and exercising of armed forces; in assisting them with operational missions like peacekeeping; and through other security assistance and related programs. However, these security assistance programs only tangentially address some of the root causes of economic and political problems. Although better at addressing these core issues, HCA and the wider nation assistance programs are still limited in aiding development because they focus mainly on military related applications, since these programs are military missions, and lower priority ones at that. Current AFRICOM military-security programs lack the depth, breadth, and persistence needed to solve Africa’s real security and stability problems.<sup>297</sup> Current foreign military engagement is also often limited in its effects because of general concerns that military involvement in economic and governing affairs sets the wrong example, and employing local forces in these ways gives them too much power, conflicts with civil organizations, and diverts them from their core military mission.<sup>298</sup> Thus despite the fact that the U.S. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Program has a charter to support security and stability in foreign countries, in part through improving their economic and governing base, it falls short of its mark, even when used in conjunction with other elements of power. The

U.S. TSC Program as now conducted is useful but of minor assistance in combating the real problems of Africa that undermine its peace and prosperity.<sup>299</sup> In any strategy used to support stability and security in Africa, this program will be a necessary part, but it is insufficient to achieve a significant lasting impact on its own. There are better ways to use foreign military forces in Africa than are currently employed.

### **Military Lead.**

No process is sacrosanct—DJS [Director, Joint Staff] shall break and redesign as needed—outcomes are what counts.

ADM Michael G. Mullen,  
*CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009*<sup>300</sup>

If much of Africa is in dire need of assistance in establishing security and stability within its countries and across its borders, would it make more sense to change the current insufficient approaches for ones that hold more promise? For the past 65 years, the U.S. military has been deeply involved in reestablishing security and stability directly in foreign countries and in improving their long-term economic well-being and political governance. U.S. military forces have done this from Germany and Japan after World War II to the in-progress efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. By doctrine, stability operations and nation assistance may occur before, during, or after conflict,<sup>301</sup> so a more active peacetime military role in Africa is possible. Such a military option could adopt as its “long term goal . . . to help develop indigenous capacity for security, essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, [and] democratic institutions . . . in its extreme, stability operations means nation-building.”<sup>302</sup> With

planning skills, manpower, resources, and appropriate expertise coordinating reserve component personnel and the whole of the U.S. Government, military forces could be the lead of a concerted effort to significantly improve peace within Africa and set it on a much delayed course to prosperity. This concept of the military leading other government agencies in attaining security and stability through economic and governing initiatives is explored in this section by examining why and how this might be accomplished, and the problems and negative consequences that detract from this as an approach. This is a reasonable option if the reader accepts that what military forces need to accomplish to prevent violence and instability is changing, and thus the military's role in security missions is also changing.<sup>303</sup>

A military lead for the U.S. Government's efforts to improve Africa's security and its economic and political well-being is not farfetched. A military lead approach has practical advantages, strong advocates, and to some degree is already occurring through the establishment and actions of USAFRICOM. Following World War II, the U.S. military had a leading role in countering the greatest threat to stabilizing Europe and Asia: the economic and political challenge of communism. Later, during the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had an increasingly important role in the U.S. Government's peace and prosperity programs through a civil-military single-manager concept over "sociopolitical reforms, economic stimuli, and military assistance."<sup>304</sup> Giving the U.S. military a similar role in Africa against today's leading threat, the economic and political ills that spawn instability and terrorism, would follow these precedents. When USAFRICOM was proposed, its initial stated purpose was to bring

“peace and security to Africa by promoting health, education, democracy, and economic growth” — seemingly a nation-building program.<sup>305</sup> Critics of the military leading a whole of government effort fear that “the Pentagon’s plans to take economic assistance programs begun in Iraq and Afghanistan and make them permanent and world-wide, with more than \$1 billion allocated to them annually,”<sup>306</sup> and it is assumed that these programs would be provided to Africa. Supporters of an expanding military role believe “that defeat of internal threats to basic public order and restoration and maintenance of minimum essential political, security, and economic conditions within victim states combined might constitute the new ‘major combat operation’ for U.S. land forces.”<sup>307</sup> As noted earlier, Thomas Barnett believes that the U.S. Army needs to promote and sustain regional security to promote U.S. and international interests by engaging not just “military and insurgent forces, but to concentrate on economic, cultural, and sociopolitical structures and issues.”<sup>308</sup> The conservative Heritage Foundation and others favor “Pentagon centered involvement . . . to include a broader combination of diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and poverty eradication,” in support of U.S. Government interests.<sup>309</sup> Despite reluctance for this mission, even DoD officials like the former Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness have concluded that to prevent future wars, the U.S. military must engage in nation building.<sup>310</sup> Although controversial, a strong case can be made that a U.S. military lead for the U.S. Government when interacting with African states and organizations to help Africans improve their unstable situation is a possibility that has merits.

The military has often led this kind of effort because there were no other viable options. Since the U.S.

military has been effective in this role, a reinforcing expectation persists that military forces should be the lead in state building for practical or expedient reasons. The problem of low intensity conflict, crime, and instability that simmers across Africa “defies purely military solutions, it requires a cross-discipline approach which recognizes the interplay of social, economic, political, and military factors.”<sup>311</sup> Since development and defense issues are so closely related, they should be addressed in tandem under one strategy and unified leadership,<sup>312</sup> a role in which U.S. military forces have experience. In past and current operations, the U.S. military has taken the lead in stabilization and reconstruction operations because civilian agencies lacked adequate resources, the mandate, or the capability to do so. This happened in Bosnia where the military Stabilization Force (SFOR) had to expand its mission to assist international organizations in typically civilian endeavors, recognizing that SFOR was “moving into the area of nation building but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to withdraw. . . .”<sup>313</sup> Similarly in Haiti in 1996 when American troops left the country, conditions deteriorated to pre-intervention levels of the early 1990s because the “civilian agencies that replaced military forces did not have the same resources available, and the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political leaders obstructed reforms.”<sup>314</sup> The U.S. DoD has been able to gather the resources and authorities needed for soft power problems and has the leadership and processes to tackle complex operations. The military could lead when civilian organizations lack the necessary means to succeed, as happened in Bosnia and Haiti. The military lead is especially needed when security is so bad that civilian organizations cannot function under the conditions, yet to meet national



goals economic development and governance must improve or military and political failures will ensue.<sup>315</sup> Preparing the military to assume the lead position in such circumstances allows it to be better prepared when it must assume this role, or when deemed best for national interests to do so.<sup>316</sup> Because of its practical merits and existing operations, military lead of U.S. Government efforts could promote security, economic development, and improved governance in Africa.

It is important to note that a military lead of U.S. Government efforts in Africa should not be a “goes it alone” effort. Military lead needs the support of the whole U.S. Government, IGO, and NGO expertise, as much as civilian organizations sometimes need the capabilities of the military to enforce security and stability.<sup>317</sup> The pantheon of participants in a military lead effort would remain the same as a civilian effort, but their relationships would change to allow the military personnel to organize, plan, and execute the effort. U.S. military units, both civil affairs and combat units, have shown they are able to execute primarily civilian responsibilities, with limited or full assistance from host governments and U.S. or international agencies.<sup>318</sup> The learning curve for such activities is steep, though, even when using reserve component forces with consummate civilian skills. The lag in learning how to apply these skills can be costly, as well, as demonstrated by the initially erratic civil-military efforts shortly after the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. However, the U.S. military is mastering these economic and governance functions, and is better able to integrate the expertise of other agencies to achieve common peace and prosperity goals.<sup>319</sup> Under a military lead, there may be needed organizations that resent the military taking the lead role, or who may be unable to

cooperate with the military in this manner. NGOs may be the most difficult case because they are independent, governed by international impartiality principles, and often prefer to work at the operational and policy levels away from the taint of parochial organizations, especially military ones.<sup>320</sup> Their aid, however, is essential in humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance, and they tend to be focused, faster in response, more experienced in their fields, and remain longer to ensure continuity than similar foreign military efforts. To overcome these barriers between the two sides, common goals can improve cooperation between the actions of NGOs and reluctant government agencies and those of U.S. forces by allowing indirect coordination through UN or U.S. civilian agencies. A common direction fosters unified action: the synchronization of government and nongovernment activities with military operations.<sup>321</sup> This proposal would broaden the unified action concept to allow civilian cooperation under military leadership, especially if such leadership maintained a discreet coordinating role much as SCAP had when working with Japanese government organizations after World War II.<sup>322</sup> This same integrated approach towards a common goal could allow for the coordination of various agencies under a military lead donor government effort with host governments, international organizations, NGOs, agencies of other countries and private entities—the definition of the comprehensive approach. Such unified action creates a community of purpose based upon accommodating the concerns of all participants, a common understanding of a situation, shared purposes, and an agreed level of cooperation.<sup>323</sup> In this way, common goals could guide the endeavors of others with military lead for

U.S. Government efforts in order to get the best from all participants assisting Africa.

Unified action in assisting a region's economic development or improving governance is a broad but relatively weak link between U.S. Government participation and the agencies of other countries, NGOs, and the private sector due to the sometimes diverging national and organizational interests involved. Within the U.S. Government, however, agencies should strive to achieve the more demanding level of coordination called unity of effort, given shared national security goals and executive leadership, but this is not often fully realized through the interagency process. Unity of effort is one of the key dimensions for stability and peace operations, and requires multilevel support from participants to succeed, whether under military or civilian lead.<sup>324</sup> This is the whole of government approach, the collaborative efforts of departments and agencies of the U.S. Government toward a single goal.<sup>325</sup> Because of its importance to successful operations, every presidential administration since President John F. Kennedy has tried to further institutionalize unity of effort within the executive branch. In 2005 the Bush administration focused interagency cooperation on stability operations through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44. This document built upon the Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Document (PDD) 56 for Managing Complex Contingency Operations to allow for better coordination efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan under the State Department, but could be reapplied to also allow a DoD lead option in Africa. NSPD-44 also requires other agencies to build their capabilities to participate in stability operations and, as an extension, state building. These improved capabilities would make coordination

under DoD (or another agency) more effective under the whole of government approach.<sup>326</sup> To enhance cooperation and understanding under military leadership (or likewise military subordination under civilian lead) all participants should together train, conduct planning, share procedures and terminology, and perform other preparatory activities needed to succeed. With this type of cooperation as a goal, FM 3-07 was written with input from many nonmilitary sources in order for it to serve as a common reference for all.<sup>327</sup> Such exercising and training are second nature to military forces, which is another advantage to a military lead scheme—better preparation of the participants under practiced military tutelage before they are needed. Planning and integration are required to improve the whole of government approach to assist in solving problems in places like Africa and, because of its strong tradition in these processes, the military is an excellent candidate to lead other organizations.

Actual coordination and execution of a plan in the field is just as important as the preparation phase among organizations, and could occur through existing centers that transform themselves into whole of government headquarters. One such case is a military civil affairs unit's Civil-Military Operations Center, which could not only "serve as the primary coordination interface for the U.S. armed forces, humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the U.S. Government" (its intended purpose),<sup>328</sup> but with proper representation and authorities from the organizations involved could also serve as a command center directing efforts in security, economic development, and governance in an efficient and effective manner. The expertise and resources of a military lead could also be inserted into other existing

coordinating bodies like the State Department's deployable Integrated Planning Cell "to synchronize and coordinate USG[overnment] planning," or in an embassy's country team. These State Department organizations are flexible in their size and composition, and can be adjusted to meet such circumstances.<sup>329</sup> An advantage of inserting a military planning and execution authority into either of these State Department organizations is the organizational skills and resources that military planning and execution of operations brings while still under the overall purview of the State Department or an ambassador—a more acceptable approach for some critics. Such hybrid military-civilian organizations blend their parochial identities, which is the point of whole of government operations. Blurring the stovepipes of organizations in order to mix capabilities is the goal—although doing so means that whoever is in charge (and someone must be) may not matter as much as whether the goals are being achieved. With the proper motivation and resources, the U.S. military "is the world's greatest nation building institution . . . [and] the United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace."<sup>330</sup> Thus planning and execution, before or after conflict, through military processes and personnel employing the experience of other government agencies may be a viable way to assist Africa.

To make a military lead and civilian hybrid operation work will require changes in the U.S. Government. The military, for instance, should develop and dedicate nation assistance specialists with broad backgrounds in the methods and roles of related government and nongovernmental organizations, and judiciously

assign such officers to appropriate government staffs.<sup>331</sup> Select military units may need to specialize as well to perform specific functions to support and interact with other government organizations or NGOs. Reserve component units, with their diverse civilian expertise, or civil-military units may be best suited for these lead or support roles. U.S. military efforts involving such units during nation assistance operations in the Balkans have been commended by civilian administrators.<sup>332</sup> Modern operations, however, have shown that stability operations and nation assistance should not be confined to specialists, although specialists are needed. Many operations may be of too great a magnitude, and their concurrent nature with traditional military operations so entangled, that any unit may need to employ these skills and knowledge at some point. Training for all units should include skills and considerations that support immediate or follow-on tasks to achieve stability, but also with an eye to economic development and enhancing governance—a different mindset than decisive combat operations.<sup>333</sup> If the military will lead such operations in the field, units must better understand and execute this mission, which is a challenging requirement given the other tasks that a combat unit must master. Such enhanced integration of the DoD and other government agencies under one command would require statutory changes, especially because such changes already seem necessary for the much less ambitious unity of effort integration and participation in nontraditional missions now attempted for USAFRICOM.<sup>334</sup>

Changes in other parts of the government must also be made for this option to work. If a standing cadre of security, economic, and governance professionals is needed, and such an organization would be beneficial to jumpstart any contingency, then U.S. Government

agencies with smaller manning authorizations than DoD will need to expand to allow regular training and contingency preparation to be effective. Such an expansion would counter the manning problem now experienced in the more modest experiment of integrating interagency personnel into USAFRICOM,<sup>335</sup> which will initially field only one non-DoD civilian for every 100 DoD members on the AFRICOM staff. Too few personnel are assigned to State Department, USAID, and other government agencies for their own missions as well as these enhanced integrated missions due to chronic under resourcing.<sup>336</sup> This imbalance can be seen as another reason that supports a military lead solution, which could fully leverage and efficiently organize the strapped assets of other departments to sustain Africa's drive for peace and prosperity. However, such "continued growth in military capability in these areas is self-reinforcing, accelerating the downward spiral of civilian capacity in favor of more expedient military solutions,"<sup>337</sup> enmeshing the military even further in these affairs. A U.S. military lead of other U.S. Government resources, and, indirectly, non-American or nongovernment assets, should only be a temporary measure until the State Department and others build expertise to truly lead under NSPD-44, or during conditions where nonmilitary organizations cannot or will not operate.<sup>338</sup> It is worth stressing that this solution should always work in tandem with functioning host nation agencies or competent citizens whenever possible to ensure the capacity building and continuity such assistance should bring.<sup>339</sup> There are some situations, including cases of extreme instability, in which a U.S. military lead role for stability and security operations may be beneficial to assist Africans resolve their economic and governance problems. But the many changes needed to

modify military, other government, and host country institutions suggests that this may be a difficult and even undesirable option.

Just because professional military forces could lead efforts in Africa does not mean that they should. Despite the merits of a military lead in terms of unity of effort or a comprehensive approach, current western democratic values and experience do not easily tolerate a military organization like USAFRICOM directing economic development and governance aid to support local governments and regional organizations. Although circumstances in Africa may be the worst in the world, the situation is not drastic enough for Western politicians or the public to call for radical measures like military oversight of traditionally civilian functions. Not only are Western countries probably not willing to overthrow centuries of successful military subordination for the uncertain prospects of speeding improvements in Africa, there are no national interests at stake with any donor country to warrant such dramatic departures, as could be argued occurred at the time of the Marshall Plan. The improvements needed to make a military lead option viable would simply reinforce stronger military attributes, often at the expense of other departments. Some State Department and USAID officials already believe that USAFRICOM may become the lead for U.S. efforts in Africa.<sup>340</sup> As evidence, critics note that DoD control of official U.S. aid money has grown from 3 percent to 22 percent in the past decade, while USAID's share has dropped from 65 to 40 percent.<sup>341</sup> Regardless of what organization is leading, the imbalance of resources and personnel available for nonmilitary government organizations to properly assist African nations must be obtained to ensure smoother cooperation towards national goals.<sup>342</sup> Overemphasizing military capabilities also



runs the danger of making the military an attractive tool of choice for situations in which its use is not appropriate, or of overestimating military capabilities where they may be of only lesser value.<sup>343</sup> Legally, there are also problems with a leading economic and governance role performed by the military. U.S. laws governing roles and missions of government organizations would need to be revised, and funding to specifically allow the military to act on economic and governance issues would have to be expanded.<sup>344</sup> Even if these actions are taken, international law remains an obstacle since it limits how military forces may act in economic development to provide security and order, unless such action is directed by an authority like the UN Security Council.<sup>345</sup> Domestic factors and traditional expectations, then, make a military lead of U.S. Government economic development efforts an awkward option.

Another reason why USAFRICOM should not be the lead in U.S. Government African affairs is that military forces are not widely trusted. USAFRICOM has had a poor initial reception in Africa following decades of U.S. Government neglect or misdirection in the name of security. Inadequate consultation with African leaders during the formation of USAFRICOM, and the prospect of neo-colonialism that has haunted Africans from since the days of Cold War engagement to today's perception that renewed interest in Africa is just a front for gaining resources and fighting terrorism are barriers to effective development.<sup>346</sup> Africans are not the only ones who are not convinced of the efficacy of USAFRICOM's more focused mission. The difficulty that other U.S. departments have in filling current USAFRICOM personnel assignments may be due as much to a skepticism or hostility towards the role of the military in Africa as to resource shortages.<sup>347</sup> An

assistant director for program development and policy at the Africa Faith and Justice Network remarked that “the blending of military and civilian agencies and the overreach of the Department of Defense . . . [is] putting a velvet glove of humanitarian aid over the fist of the military.”<sup>348</sup> Some U.S. Government aid officials also do not want to be stigmatized by being directly associated with the military, regardless of other advantages such an association offers.<sup>349</sup> Such concerns are not new, and were also expressed during the early Vietnam War years when the fear was that the militarization of policy would give military men influence in areas that had previously been the exclusive domain of civilians.<sup>350</sup> On top of all these problems, some skeptics doubt that the military alone, or as a lead, has been very effective in these roles. One study found that in 51 cases where U.S. or British forces intervened, they were successful only 25 percent of the time, and some of those situations could probably have been stabilized and reconstruction carried out without military intervention.<sup>351</sup> A military lead effort for economic development and governance improvement would fail without the support of crucial African, international, and U.S. Government elements. So far, this support has not been gained and will not be obtained under current circumstances.

Although the U.S. military has a long history of involvement in stability operations before and after conflict and with peace building, its results have been mixed. Military forces do have the capability to organize, lead, and assist in complex foreign development and governance issues to further stability and security in places like Africa. They could assume a lead role through various existing structures and by overseeing the sharing of resources, processes, and training needed to make cooperation more effective. To streamline its role, the military should groom more

specialists and specialty units, and generally orient other units toward development and governance missions. Other government agencies will also need more robust resources and training to better synchronize their efforts. Even with these improvements, the deep resources, established processes, and can-do military attitude could overwhelm cross-discipline efforts when the military is in the lead. Critics of this approach fear that continued overreliance on the military eviscerates the civilian, international, and nongovernmental organizations that specialize in these roles and sets a poor example of civil-military relations for the people that these efforts are meant to help. Furthermore, U.S. public expectation will not allow the military to lead civilian organizations in most cases. Given the realities of the situation, meritorious though a military lead might seem, perhaps a better solution is to reverse the positions and adequately resource civilian institutions to lead along with appropriate support from military forces, such as USAFRICOM.

### **Civilian Lead.**

However, we cannot meet the challenges of today and those of tomorrow with military power alone. We must guard against further militarization of our foreign policy . . . it is vital that we not only develop our military capabilities, but also strengthen capacity of other government agencies and that of our foreign partners.

ADM Michael Mullen  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>352</sup>

So far, many topics have been covered by this paper with the intent to impart the importance of Africa to U.S. affairs; the links between problems that Africa faces in economic development, governance, security, and

stability; and two ways that USAFRICOM can address some of these problems through improving the current method of theater engagement, or leading a unified U.S. Government or international comprehensive approach. Both approaches offer advantages, but also significant disadvantages. Thus a third option of subordinating U.S. military efforts squarely under the capable leadership of robust diplomatic and development organizations is tentatively being pursued by the U.S. Government. Most of the elements by which the U.S. and other governments can assist Africans towards peace and prosperity already exist; they just need to be properly structured and resourced. The U.S. and other militaries are important government elements needed under a civilian lead because of the military's contacts with influential organizations in African societies; effective resources; specialized development and security expertise; and experience in organizing, directing, and executing complex operations. These are the same strengths that support arguments for a military lead, but here they would be employed under civilian organizations such as USAID or the State Department. If these institutions were adequately resourced and properly directed, a civilian-lead U.S. Government team would be readily accepted by the international and African communities. Not only could this combination better help Africans attain the security and stability they need through economic development and improved governance, but may better serve U.S. national security and military interests in the process. The methods used in regional development and improvement are widely known and debated, and thus beyond the scope of this already lengthy tome. Therefore, this section focuses on the continuing improvements being made toward strengthening

civilian while incorporating military capabilities, and offers some additional recommendations to ensure the future success of this arrangement. If the U.S. Government and the international community are serious about assisting Africans to follow a path to prosperity, proper governance, and security, the following proposals outline how these objectives may be achieved.

Because USAFRICOM is perceived by some as becoming the proconsul of U.S. Government affairs in Africa—interfering outside of its own proper role—a more appropriate U.S. Government civilian institution like USAID should reassume this role through adequate resourcing and support. Many Africans, suspicious of any increased military role wonder why the U.S. Government lead for assistance is not given to an existing institution that specializes in promoting development and is more locally and internationally acceptable.<sup>353</sup> USAID is active throughout Africa and it has assisted there for decades and is respected for its work. Civilian whole of government leadership under USAID offers the advantages of organic expertise in economic and development issues and its inherent focus on long-term solutions; neither of which are integral to military efforts since they are viewed as secondary missions. The existing nebulous division of labor between civilian and military is also perceived as a competition for funds, which undercuts the professional developers.<sup>354</sup> The current U.S. political system brings both military and civilian efforts together under the same leadership only at the chief executive level. Since long-term African affairs, like development, rarely rise to sufficient national interest levels that would demand coordination by the U.S. President, competition over goals and resources occurs at lower levels to the current

detriment of civilian efforts. The National Security Council (NSC) is supposed to coordinate and lead U.S. Government departments through coordinated foreign policy advice for the President but, to do so, the NSC leadership would have to recognize that economic and governance problems in Africa are security issues and that Africa's importance warrants long-term oversight and coordination of whole of government efforts towards stated U.S. goals. Such recognition has not yet occurred at this level. The process to attain national security goals in Africa should be civilian, with military capabilities synchronized toward "soft power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict . . .," which is the comprehensive approach to stability operations and peace building advocated by FM 3-07.<sup>355</sup> Assuming that a civilian organization like USAID is better suited than a military force to lead whole of government efforts in Africa, some of the ways this approach is being adopted will now be discussed.

Since traditional means to coordinate U.S. policy and efforts have been unable to fulfill stability and stabilization requirements, another method has evolved within the U.S. Government. The 2005 NSPD-44 requires the State Department "to coordinate and lead U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities . . . to include balancing civilian and military activities."<sup>356</sup> This mission includes improving the U.S. Government's institutional capacity to intervene successfully before, during, and after security problems arise.<sup>357</sup> Given the will to assist, the NSPD-44 mandate is broad enough to incorporate improving conditions in Africa to achieve stabilization and security through

economic development and better governance. A decade ago, such an effort in Haiti under USAID's lead synchronized civilian and military stabilization and reconstruction activities, but achieved mixed results.<sup>358</sup> The Haiti mission demonstrated that such an arrangement could work, but that USAID needed more resources, robust planning and executing abilities, and access to wider expertise. These lessons were learned again in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that by 2007 the State Department formed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), to "promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization activities,"<sup>359</sup> fulfilling NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05 expectations. To solve those earlier shortcomings, S/CRS instituted several means to enable its peace building mission. First was the Interagency Management System, consisting of an interagency stabilization and reconstruction decision-making policy committee, a civilian team of strategic planners, and deployable advance teams to balance its capabilities with those found in military units. For more depth in running its operations, S/CRS also has a whole of government planning framework for conflict prevention planning in both crisis and long-term situations and the Civilian Response Corps, a three tiered system to muster personnel and expertise akin to the military's active duty and reserve forces.<sup>360</sup> To build upon these gains, USAID is also developing the concept of Smart Power and Development to explore how to "strengthen our development principles while building civilian-military cooperation . . . [recognizing] a growing consensus that a smart power strategy should comprise both military and non-military tools to address instability. . . ." <sup>361</sup> Its intent is to make

diplomacy and development by the U.S. Government “more agile, responsive, and complimentary [sic].”<sup>362</sup> Although still being implemented, these are all salutary steps in the right direction to improve the ability of the civilian component to plan, execute, and lead stability efforts through economic development and good governance.

Since civilian organizations are already struggling to complete their rebuilding responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, more resources and people are needed to enable an expanded and extensive mission in Africa as proposed in this paper. Because of its mission and expertise, the responsibility for U.S. Government foreign capacity building and development belongs to USAID,<sup>363</sup> which one member of Congress called a checkwriting agency because it cannot fulfill its core missions without contractor support. From its height in 1968 while providing support for the Vietnam and other Cold War efforts, USAID has decreased in size from 17,500 employees to 2,400 in 2005. That small staff currently provides support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world. More people are needed by USAID, and the Obama administration is adding 281 new officers. These will not be enough, and it will take years to fully integrate even these few.<sup>364</sup> To obtain more resources and people and to better use what it has, the State Department proposes to follow the example of DoD’s *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) with a *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR). The QDDR will identify the State Department as the lead for the coordination effort of all agencies involved in diplomacy and development, to match resources and funds to strategic priorities, and to influence long-term policy, funding, and resourcing decisions within a common overarching vision.<sup>365</sup> The QDDR



could succeed in giving diplomatic and development efforts the credibility needed by Congress to gain real backing and bridge the culture, capability, and resource disparities among USAID, the State Department, and DoD. A congressional advocate may also be needed to rebalance some defense funds dedicated for future training, planning, and execution of stability operations to diplomacy and development funds to correct the 17 to 1 spending ratio now in place.<sup>366</sup> However, putting DoD and the State Department in direct competition for funds in a tight budget process undermines the unity of effort championed by this paper.<sup>367</sup> Some inherent civil-military stability operations capability must remain within the military for combat and its aftermath, and for conditions where civilian agencies cannot or have not yet started to operate.<sup>368</sup> However, transferring longer-term responsibilities and capabilities to civilian professionals, and ultimately to indigenous personnel, allows military forces to better focus on their core missions, strengthens the ability of civilian agencies and host governments to accomplish their roles, and removes the specter of a militarized foreign policy that concerns so many.<sup>369</sup> Not only would development professionals be enabled, but ultimately more security would be obtained because in unsettled third world regions like Africa, development and stability assistance investments have far greater influence on security than the same money put directly into U.S. armed forces.<sup>370</sup> Putting more resources into civilian organizations balances the ability to stabilize and develop areas whose security is weak—making it an investment against having to send in foreign troops.

Although more resources and manning may be required by the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government who are tasked with foreign capacity building, better

understanding and coordination of roles, resources, and policy is important too—and less expensive to implement. Rather than allocating entirely new resources during fiscally constrained times, what may be needed is an approach to:

share resources among U.S. Government agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal. These resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications— are often limited in availability. . . . To achieve the broad success envisioned in a whole of government engagement, all must be integral to unified action.”<sup>371</sup>

Unified action is also attained through shared understanding, as found in FM 3-07 written with, by, and for representatives from many nondefense organizations involved in stabilization and peace building. It is a reference for “other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), agencies of other governments, international organizations, nongovernment organizations, and private sector entities” covering how military and civilian efforts complement each other.<sup>372</sup> Published a year later in 2009, *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, a parallel whole of government document, was written to bind reconstruction efforts closer together for the numerous parts of the U.S. Government.<sup>373</sup> Towards comprehensive action, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* strives to facilitate actions among international organizations, NGOs, U.S. Government civilian agencies, and the military.<sup>374</sup> These recent coordination documents are complemented by

other organizational efforts to improve interaction of government efforts under a civilian lead. Among coordinating bodies, the USIP launched the Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-Permissive Environments. It is composed of NGOs, DoD, the State Department, and USAID, and meets to discuss issues of relationships, doctrine, and other matters of mutual concern.<sup>375</sup> Another unified effort by these players is the Center for Complex Operations covering irregular warfare, peace operations, and stability operations to build a community of practice of civilian and military operators to prepare for complex operations.<sup>376</sup> The process to expand resources for diplomatic and development efforts and to better understand, coordinate, and execute interagency and international efforts is developing in the right direction. USAFRICOM and DoD should wholeheartedly support these efforts, as they are in the best interests of the United States and the U.S. military.

These changes designed to strength the role of development and governance to achieve stability and security indicate their importance in foreign policy. Enlarging and reinforcing civilian lead and participation is the right alternative. There are many more things that could be done based upon the analysis in this paper, but two points need to be emphasized to complete this primer. First, U.S. national security and stability interests are best served when DoD squarely supports an effective civilian lead agency like USAID that has the expertise, resources, and international acceptance to accomplish the tasks that will result in long-term peace and prosperity. Although many processes are in place to improve the capabilities to accomplish this, one remains to be answered: who is in charge of regional efforts? Who is the equivalent of a regional

combatant commander to guide regional development actions, as does the commander of USAFRICOM in military affairs, to balance, or monitor, the combatant commander's very potent influence? One way is to appoint an equivalent diplomatic proconsul, "a regional super ambassador with clear authority to integrate all U.S. Government activities in a region." [Another way to enhance unity of effort is to create a] "Standing Regional Security Council composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments and agencies,"<sup>377</sup> perhaps as subdivisions of the NSC or within the State Department's regional bureaus. These options support security through long-term economic development and governance, as advocated throughout this paper, to enable agencies like USAID to play a leading part. Either option offers a clear leader for attaining U.S. Government interests and ensures effective use of efforts and resources in making departments and agencies equal partners in the interagency process.<sup>378</sup>

Just as proper roles and resourcing of each U.S. Government organization under strong civilian leadership is important for unity of effort in assisting Africans, so too is that this is accomplished under a comprehensive international effort that brings together the many worldwide participants in a unified action to supplement (and perhaps occasionally to resuscitate) local African organizations. Each country offers particular skills and expertise needed to improve Africa's condition, and all are limited by funding, personnel, and resources in what can be accomplished. Better international coordination of these efforts, government and otherwise, would greatly help local governments navigate through literally thousands of well-intentioned piecemeal projects. Donors could

share lead responsibilities by sub-region or expertise to best benefit recipients and, in so doing, work more efficiently towards improving the economic and governing conditions that lead to security.<sup>379</sup> Such coordination complicates assistance work for donors, but magnifies its potential good, which is the intent of NSPD-44.<sup>380</sup> Donors should sublimate recognition for their largesse, often an important motivation for countries currying favor with a recipient, toward the greater good of establishing peace and prosperity in Africa. When support is provided by African partners with the greater good in mind, local capacity is improved while fostering long-term gains and promoting African self-sufficiency. When done together with regional organizations, like ECOWAS rather than individual countries, coordinated donor efforts simplify the process for Africans, who share more responsibility, too. This leverages the ability of African states to sustain success and may also reduce instability recidivism, since any problems that do arise are African problems to solve through a regional organization instead of becoming international problems that may be ignored or that may serve as excuses for foreign intervention.<sup>381</sup> Coordinating efforts between international participants can ensure that limited development funds go farther in support of African security and stability operations.

U.S. Government and international civilian organizations have the mandate and experience needed to help Africans improve their situation. The U.S. and other militaries should play their accepted role in enforcing security and stability directly and indirectly through economic development and good governance, but firmly under overarching civilian oversight. The perception that a robust USAFRICOM may overstep this accepted order requires that the

existing system of procedures and proposals between civilian and military organizations be reinforced and improvements hastened. NSPD-44 clearly designates the State Department as the overall lead in stability and peace operations, but both State and USAID need more resources and backing to fulfill this charge. In support of the lead mission, changes are being made to fully use assets that are available to the State Department and USAID, and more are proposed, including starting a QDDR to better allocate the necessary funding and manning to carry out these requirements. Coordinating assets and procedures among the whole of the U.S. Government is also part of this streamlining effort. Finally, designating a directional body or person for regional affairs could better balance resources and efforts within the U.S. Government, and facilitate coordination of actions with other governments, NGOs, and IGOs. For practical reasons and to honor longstanding democratic traditions, the best way to attain U. S. national interests in Africa and other regions of the world would be to consolidate economic development and good governance as security and stability issues under USAID.

## SUMMARY

There is no limit to what a man can do or where he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit.

President Ronald W. Reagan<sup>382</sup>

This paper has traced the need for change in the U.S. Government's Africa policy and processes, described how change is happening, and suggested what still could be done. Rather than advocating radically new policies, this paper concludes that the U.S. Government

and the international community are starting down a promising track with Africans to confront their problems of political and economic malaise. This paper has provided a survey of the current situation in Africa in order to assist newly assigned personnel improve their understanding of U.S. military and government policy and doctrine that supports these efforts. Africa is important to U.S. national interests because of its cultural and economic ties, strategic central location, environmental influence, humanitarian suffering, and potential to spur violence and spread disease throughout the world. Consequently, Africa is worthy of the greater consideration that it has recently received. Africa's situation is economically and politically the worst in the world, which adversely affects its population's health and education, its freedoms, and its chances for stability and security—putting Africa further behind and unable to participate in an ever more tightly linked global economy. Its current economic growth potential through its primary, secondary, and tertiary economic activities is meager and requires external assistance to realize the economic and political gains needed for true stability and security. Such precarious security and stability creates internal turmoil instead of focusing positive energy toward problem resolution. Since long-term security and stability rest on economic development and proper governance, these latter two elements must be addressed to meet the African and international goals of peace and relative prosperity for Africa. Otherwise African strife might disrupt international security by causing African nations to become sanctuaries for terrorists, or they might require international military intervention to stop suffering. Both governance and development must be tackled together, and military forces can play an important

part through coordinated stability operations and peace building.

The U.S. military has a role to play in establishing these benign conditions in Africa, and the founding of USAFRICOM focuses and coordinates military efforts to better do so. The traditional and current method for military forces to promote stability and security is through such direct intervention as peace operations or, preferably by enabling host forces to play their role in security as enhanced by U.S. theater engagement activities like security cooperation, education, ACOTA, HCA, and nation assistance. Although important, these activities have a limited influence on the root causes of instability, and therefore the roles of military forces could be expanded. One way is to broaden USAFRICOM's role as leader and coordinator of U.S. Government interagency efforts to improve economic development and good governance. Although the U.S. military has performed such a role throughout history, this usually occurred after conflict in which the U.S. military was involved and obligated to stabilize the situation and to rebuild. Directly involving the military in sustained development efforts or as the lead of a larger effort to rebuild shattered or faltering states where the United States had no previous role is a departure from the norm. This departure may be difficult for Africans, the U.S. public, and the international community to tolerate. It is also counter to the dictates of NSPD-44 and would require many changes to implement at the scale envisioned here. The possible gain in support of national interests from a more peaceful and prosperous Africa does not justify the precedent and organizational disruption that such a military lead entails. Therefore the good that the military offers in terms of countering violence and establishing order and



enabling the more efficient and acceptable delivery of economic and political development, should be firmly directed by civilian control – be it unity of effort of U.S. Government organizations or unified action with the international community. To reinforce the civilian lead in these efforts, the U.S. Government needs to continue to emphasize civilian leadership through improved manning, resources, processes, and greater integration of military-civilian efforts. To stretch limited resources and expertise, coordinating the efforts of individual state donors could greatly amplify the good achieved by each. Africa needs outside assistance to better its situation. The United States and others will benefit by offering this help.

Although this paper recommends subordinating the military role to a civilian lead, the military's mission to attain security and stability remain important whenever needed. Military forces should first focus on security enforcement for which they are the specialists within the U.S. Government and then address the necessary tasks of stabilization and peace building, putting into place the structure for proper governance and a viable economy required by a functioning state. These steps are required to lay the foundation for the efforts of development agencies and local officials to carry out their tasks of peace, state, and nation building. All of these efforts, though, should be in support of local initiatives and organizations when possible. Within the U.S. Government, the military should complete appropriate security and stability enforcement tasks and judiciously support development and governance tasks under the strong leadership of properly outfitted professional civilian agencies during and after crises, but especially before a crisis when such U.S. Government support has the greatest impact. The

military lacks the depth of knowledge in the crucial disciplines that bring long-term security and stability to a state or region. For this reason, the military should defer to civilian professionals, and support them where its suits U.S. interests and the needs of Africans. The depressed state in Africa offers many opportunities to help. This paper serves as a primer for those outside the continent who wish to improve its long-term security and stability through economic development and better governance. It is time for Africans to interact with the global community as equals, and the present course puts them on that much delayed path.

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